

# LEBANON

**NEARLY 900,000 PEOPLE CONTINUE TO FACE HIGH LEVELS OF ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY AMID FRAGILE RECOVERY AND DECLINING ASSISTANCE**

## IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ANALYSIS

NOVEMBER 2025 - JULY 2026

Published on 23 December 2025

**CURRENT PERIOD: NOVEMBER 2025 – MARCH 2026**  
(Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees, post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria)



**874,000**

17 percent of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	22,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	851,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	2,104,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	2,213,000 People in Food Security

**PROJECTED PERIOD: APRIL - JULY 2026**  
(Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees, post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria)



**961,000**

18 percent of the population analysed

People likely facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	63,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	898,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	2,017,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	2,214,000 People in Food Security

## Overview


The acute food insecurity situation in Lebanon has further eased compared to the first half of 2025, but there are still a significant number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Between November 2025 and March 2026, around 874,000 Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees and post-2024 arrivals<sup>1</sup> continue experiencing IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse). This includes 22,000 people experiencing large food gaps and high levels of acute malnutrition, classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 851,000 people who are unable to meet their essential food requirements and resort to unsustainable coping measures, classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis).

This IPC analysis covered four population groups: Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees displaced before December 2024, Palestine refugees, and post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria, following the transition of administration in December 2024.


The reduction in the proportion of the population classified in IPC Phase 3 or above compared to the previous analysis conducted in March 2025, reflects a combination of factors. The holding of the November 2024 ceasefire enabled large-scale returns of internally displaced people and restored market access. Market functionality promptly recovered, with a wide assortment of essential goods becoming fully available. Exchange rate stability and moderated inflation, alongside seasonal income opportunities and remittances, also contributed to easing pressure on households' food access. Finally, continued humanitarian assistance—which despite funding cuts—also contributed to the improvement of the situation, reaching an average of 24 percent of Lebanese households and 53 percent of Syrian refugees between April and September 2025, and covering 51 percent of daily kilocalorie needs.

However, food insecurity remains uneven and concentrated in high-severity pockets, particularly in the districts of Baalbek,

## Current Acute Food Insecurity: November 2025 - March 2026



## Projected Acute Food Insecurity: April - July 2026



<sup>1</sup> Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria

El Hermel, Akkar, Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh, and Sour, and among refugee populations. Out of the total populations analysed, 484,000 Lebanese residents (13 percent of the resident population), 277,000 Syrian refugees (28 percent of the total Syrian refugee population in Lebanon), 69,000 Palestine refugees (30 percent of the total Palestine refugee population in Lebanon), and 43,000 post-2024 arrivals (45 percent of the post-2024 arrivals analysed population) are facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) and require urgent response action to fill their food needs and to protect and save lives and livelihoods.

In addition to long-standing Syrian refugees, a new population group, the post-2024 arrivals, has emerged since late 2024. This group comprises over 100,000 people who fled renewed violence in northern and western Syria following the regime change in December 2024. They differ from earlier refugee cohorts in timing, displacement drivers, and vulnerability—warranting separate consideration in food security analysis and humanitarian response planning. Vulnerability assessment findings reveal that they have limited social networks in Lebanon, cannot rely on the same coping strategies as other refugee population groups, and face acute humanitarian needs. The post-2024 arrivals were analysed within three units of analysis, namely the districts of Akkar and Tripoli and the cluster of Baalbek & El Hermel. In all three units of analysis, 35 percent were categorised in Phase 3 and 10 percent in Phase 4 making it the population with the highest proportion of acute food insecurity at national level.

Vulnerability in Lebanon among all population groups is driven by the lingering economic crisis, slow reconstruction—despite USD \$14 billion in losses—and funding shortfalls for humanitarian assistance. Coverage is projected to decline from 24 percent to 20 percent for Lebanese and from 53 percent to 4 percent for Syrian refugees between April and July 2026, and no funding for Syrian refugees beyond April 2026 has been confirmed. Additional factors include localised insecurity, displacement pressures, and high living costs. These factors are reflected in the projection period, from April to July 2026, with an increase to 961,000 people projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), equivalent to 18 percent of the total analysed population. The areas that are expected to face the highest prevalence of acute food insecurity throughout all population groups in the projected period are Baalbek & El Hermel (146,000 people), Akkar (141,000 people), Baabda (93,000 people), Zahle (66,000 people), and Saida (50,000 people).

Despite notable improvements in food security since November 2024 (ceasefire)—when 1.65 million people were classified in IPC Phase 3 or above—the situation in Lebanon remains highly fragile. Progress is precarious, as it depends heavily on the evolving conflict and the broader economic context. Persistent challenges, including damaged infrastructure, a stagnant economy, high inflation, and constrained humanitarian access and funding, continue to threaten recovery efforts and underscore the need for sustained support and coordinated action between humanitarian and development actors.



**Delayed reconstruction and conflict impact:** Nearly a year after the ceasefire, recovery remains slow. Despite improved security, the impact of the 2023–2024 conflict continues to constrain livelihoods and services. The World Bank estimates USD \$14 billion in total losses and USD \$11 billion in recovery needs, yet large-scale reconstruction has not materialised beyond the recently signed USD \$250 million Lebanon Emergency Assistance Project (LEAP) loan, leaving critical gaps in housing, infrastructure, and agriculture.



**Population displacement and pressure on services:** While 986,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have returned, about 64,000 remain displaced, and over 120,000 post-2024 arrivals have added pressure on host communities and services, especially in Akkar, Tripoli, Baalbek and El Hermel districts. Rental markets are highly strained, with 85 percent of displaced households renting, increasing vulnerability for both displaced and host families.



**Agricultural disruption:** Conflict-related damage to irrigation systems, feeder roads, and storage facilities continue to limit agricultural recovery. Reduced crop yields and high input costs undermine rural livelihoods and local food production and availability, particularly in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa.



**Funding shortfalls for Humanitarian Food Security Assistance (HFSA):** Humanitarian food security assistance, which was critical in stabilising food security after the conflict, has faced severe funding cuts. Coverage fell from 24 percent for Lebanese households and 53 percent for Syrian refugees between April and September 2025 —covering about 51 percent of daily kilocalorie needs— to 20 percent and 48 percent in the current period (November 2025 to March 2026) and is projected to drop to 19 percent and 4 percent by April–July 2026 respectively, with kilocalorie coverage projected to decline to 47 percent. Moreover, there is no confirmed funding to assist Syrian refugees beyond April 2026. These reductions risk reversing recent gains and increasing vulnerability among households currently in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed).



**Economic fragility and high living costs:** Lebanon's economy remains fragile, with unemployment at 27 percent among Lebanese in the period between April and October 2025, with a large proportion of workers in informal jobs (34 percent in 2022-23), and limited recovery in key sectors. Yearly inflation is projected to moderate to 15 percent in 2025, down from 45 percent in 2024 (World Bank), but high costs for non-food essentials continue to erode purchasing power, particularly for low-income households and refugees.

## POPULATION

For this analysis, the IPC Technical Working Group (TWG) endorsed the use of population figures as presented by the Inter-Agency Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) for the Lebanon Response Plan (LRP) 2026 planning exercise, to ensure consistency with national planning frameworks. As such, for Lebanese residents, the figures used were those published in the LRP 2026 planning package, which had already been updated by the ISCG to reflect the latest displacement data from the IOM DTM exercise. For Syrian refugees, district level data as provided as well by the ISCG in the LRP 2026 planning package were used, with a revised baseline of 1 million people. This represents a significant adjustment from the 1.4 million used in the previous IPC analysis and the 1.5 million applied in earlier rounds, reflecting updated estimates and ongoing population movements. This revision has a direct impact on absolute numbers in Phase 3 or above, even though severity among Syrian refugees remains high (28 percent classified in Phase 3 or above).

For Palestine refugees, the TWG agreed to use the latest figure provided by UNRWA (231,515 people) instead of the ISCG baseline (224,791). This decision was made following consultations with ISCG and UNRWA. ISCG clarified that the baseline figure of 224,791 was maintained for the Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework (JIAF) analysis to ensure consistency across inter-agency planning, while acknowledging that UNRWA regularly compiles updated figures. For the IPC analysis, the TWG determined that using the most recent UNRWA data would provide greater accuracy, provided that the date of update is noted to explain any differences with other frameworks.


For post-2024 arrivals, a newly assessed population group was included for the first time due to their distinct characteristics and heightened vulnerability. The ISCG planning figure for LRP 2026 is 120,000 people. However, this analysis covers approximately 96,000 people (80 percent of the post-2024 arrivals), representing those present in the three units of analysis—namely, the districts of Akkar and Tripoli and the cluster of Baalbek & El Hermel. Other districts hosting smaller caseloads (less than 10,000 people) were excluded.


## DISCLAIMER


*This report incorporates population figures based on the data endorsed by the LRP and inter-agency coordination systems and updated based on the latest displacement data for Lebanese residents as per the IOM DTM report. These figures were utilised in recognition of the inherent challenges in accurately estimating population numbers during this fluid and evolving period. Factors influencing this decision include the lack of reliable baseline population figures, significant cross-border movements between Lebanon and Syria, and discrepancies in existing estimates of displacement and population movements, as highlighted above.*


*The report acknowledges the provisional nature of these figures and will review them in subsequent IPC rounds, as soon as greater clarity and updated data becomes available. This approach aims to ensure alignment with ongoing planning and coordination mechanisms in Lebanon, avoiding divergence that could hinder collective response efforts.*


## CURRENT SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (NOVEMBER 2025 – MARCH 2026)

LEBANESE RESIDENTS CURRENT AFI: November 2025 - March 2026		
 <b>484,000</b> 13% of the population analysed  People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)  IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4	0 People in Emergency
	Phase 3	484,000 People in Crisis
	Phase 2	1,440,000 People in Stressed
	Phase 1	1,940,000 People in Food Security

SYRIAN REFUGEES CURRENT AFI: November 2025 - March 2026		
 <b>277,000</b> 28% of the population analysed  People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)  IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4	1,300 People in Emergency
	Phase 3	276,000 People in Crisis
	Phase 2	517,000 People in Stressed
	Phase 1	206,000 People in Food Security

PALESTINE REFUGEES CURRENT AFI: November 2025 - March 2026		
 <b>69,000</b> 30% of the population analysed  People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)  IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4	11,500 People in Emergency
	Phase 3	58,000 People in Crisis
	Phase 2	104,000 People in Stressed
	Phase 1	58,000 People in Food Security

POST-DECEMBER 2024 ARRIVALS FROM SYRIA CURRENT AFI: November 2025 - March 2026		
 <b>43,000</b> 45% of the population analysed  People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)  IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4	9,500 People in Emergency
	Phase 3	33,500 People in Crisis
	Phase 2	43,000 People in Stressed
	Phase 1	10,000 People in Food Security





## POPULATION TABLE FOR THE CURRENT PERIOD (NOVEMBER 2025 – MARCH 2026)

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Akkar	Lebanese	296,722	89,017	30	133,525	45	74,181	25	0	0	0	0	3	74,181	25
	Syrian ref.	143,121	21,468	15	78,717	55	42,936	30	0	0	0	0	3	42,936	30
	Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria	16,661	1,666	10	7,497	45	5,831	35	1,666	10	0	0	3	7,497	45
	Total	456,504	112,151	25	219,739	48	122,948	27	1,666	0	0	0		124,614	27
Aley	Lebanese	215,290	118,410	55	75,352	35	21,529	10	0	0	0	0	2	21,529	10
	Syrian ref.	64,105	19,232	30	35,258	55	9,616	15	0	0	0	0	2	9,616	15
	Total	279,395	137,641	49	110,609	40	31,145	11	0	0	0	0		31,145	11
Baabda	Lebanese	408,641	183,888	45	163,456	40	61,296	15	0	0	0	0	2	61,296	15
	Syrian ref.	105,351	26,338	25	52,676	50	26,338	25	0	0	0	0	3	26,338	25
	Total	513,992	210,226	41	216,132	42	87,634	17	0	0	0	0		87,634	17
Baalbek & El Hermel	Baalbek & El Hermel Lebanese	220,695	66,209	30	99,313	45	55,174	25	0	0	0	0	3	55,174	25
	Baalbek Syrian ref.	112,272	11,227	10	56,136	50	44,909	40	0	0	0	0	3	44,909	40
	El Hermel Syrian ref.	5,342	534	10	2,938	55	1,603	30	267	5	0	0	3	1,870	35
	Baalbek & El Hermel post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria	68,288	6,829	10	30,730	45	23,901	35	6,829	10	0	0	3	30,730	45
	Total	406,597	84,799	21	189,116	47	125,586	31	7,096	2	0	0		132,682	33
Bcharre & Zgharta	Bcharre & Zgharta Lebanese	93,544	56,126	60	28,063	30	9,354	10	0	0	0	0	2	9,354	10
	Bcharre Syrian ref.	1,191	417	35	596	50	179	15	0	0	0	0	2	179	15
	Zgharta Syrian ref.	12,217	3,665	30	5,498	45	3,054	25	0	0	0	0	3	3,054	25
	Total	106,952	60,208	56	34,156	32	12,587	12	0	0	0	0		12,587	12
Beirut	Lebanese	237,027	154,068	65	71,108	30	11,851	5	0	0	0	0	2	11,851	5
	Syrian ref.	31,875	9,563	30	17,531	55	4,781	15	0	0	0	0	2	4,781	15
	Total	268,902	163,630	61	88,639	33	16,633	6	0	0	0	0		16,633	6
Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun	Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun Lebanese	83,599	25,080	30	41,800	50	16,720	20	0	0	0	0	3	16,720	20
	Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun Syrian ref.	12,718	2,544	20	6,995	55	3,180	25	0	0			3	3,180	25
	Total	96,317	27,623	29	48,794	51	19,899	21	0	0	0	0		19,899	21
Chouf & Jezzine	Chouf & Jezzine Lebanese	235,529	129,541	55	82,435	35	23,553	10	0	0	0	0	2	23,553	10
	Chouf Syrian ref.	46,343	11,586	25	25,489	55	9,269	20	0	0	0	0	3	9,269	20
	Jezzine Syrian ref.	2,664	666	25	1,465	55	533	20	0	0	0	0	3	533	20
	Total	284,536	141,793	50	109,389	38	33,354	12	0	0	0	0		33,354	12

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
El Batroun & El Koura	El Batroun & El Koura Lebanese	125,245	87,672	70	31,311	25	6,262	5	0	0	0	0	2	6,262	5
	El Batroun Syrian ref.	12,163	3,041	25	6,690	55	2,433	20	0	0	0	0	3	2,433	20
	El Koura Syrian ref.	14,958	3,740	25	7,479	50	3,740	25	0	0	0	0	3	3,740	25
	<b>Total</b>	<b>152,366</b>	<b>94,452</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>45,480</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>12,434</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>12,434</b>	<b>8</b>
El Meten	Lebanese	396,657	277,660	70	99,164	25	19,833	5	0	0	0	0	2	19,833	5
	Syrian ref.	52,175	18,261	35	26,088	50	7,826	15	0	0	0	0	2	7,826	15
	<b>Total</b>	<b>448,832</b>	<b>295,921</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>125,252</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>27,659</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>27,659</b>	<b>6</b>
El Minieh-Dennie	Lebanese	121,534	48,614	40	48,614	40	24,307	20	0	0	0	0	3	24,307	20
	Syrian ref.	44,509	8,902	20	22,255	50	13,353	30	0	0	0	0	3	13,353	30
	<b>Total</b>	<b>166,043</b>	<b>57,515</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>70,868</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>37,660</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>37,660</b>	<b>23</b>
El Nabatieh	Lebanese	206,128	61,838	30	113,370	55	30,919	15	0	0	0	0	2	30,919	15
	Syrian ref.	21,367	3,205	15	11,752	55	5,342	25	1,068	5	0	0	3	6,410	30
	<b>Total</b>	<b>227,495</b>	<b>65,043</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>125,122</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>36,261</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>1,068</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>37,329</b>	<b>16</b>
Hasbaya & Rachaya	Hasbaya & Rachaya Lebanese	56,688	34,013	60	17,006	30	5,669	10	0	0	0	0	2	5,669	10
	Hasbaya Syrian ref.	3,443	1,549	45	1,033	30	861	25	0	0	0	0	3	861	25
	Rachaya Syrian ref.	3,973	596	15	2,582	65	795	20	0	0	0	0	3	795	20
	<b>Total</b>	<b>64,104</b>	<b>36,158</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>20,622</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>7,324</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>7,324</b>	<b>11</b>
Jbeil & Kesrwane	Jbeil & Kesrwane Lebanese	344,933	241,453	70	86,233	25	17,247	5	0	0	0	0	2	17,247	5
	Jbeil Syrian ref.	10,733	2,683	25	6,440	60	1,610	15	0	0	0	0	2	1,610	15
	Kesrwane Syrian ref.	19,437	6,803	35	9,719	50	2,916	15	0	0	0	0	2	2,916	15
	<b>Total</b>	<b>375,103</b>	<b>250,939</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>102,392</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>21,772</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>21,772</b>	<b>6</b>
Saida	Lebanese	233,189	104,935	45	93,276	40	34,978	15	0	0	0	0	2	34,978	15
	Syrian ref.	43,785	8,757	20	21,893	50	13,136	30	0	0	0	0	3	13,136	30
	<b>Total</b>	<b>276,974</b>	<b>113,692</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>115,168</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>48,114</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>48,114</b>	<b>17</b>
Sour	Lebanese	181,467	54,440	30	99,807	55	27,220	15	0	0	0	0	2	27,220	15
	Syrian ref.	27,408	6,852	25	13,704	50	6,852	25	0	0	0	0	3	6,852	25
	<b>Total</b>	<b>208,875</b>	<b>61,292</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>113,511</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>34,072</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>34,072</b>	<b>16</b>
Tripoli	Lebanese	200,469	100,235	50	80,188	40	20,047	10	0	0	0	0	2	20,047	10
	Syrian ref.	27,512	6,878	25	13,756	50	6,878	25	0	0	0	0	3	6,878	25
	Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria	10,907	1,091	10	4,908	45	3,817	35	1,091	10	0	0	3	4,908	45
	<b>Total</b>	<b>238,888</b>	<b>108,203</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>98,852</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>30,742</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>1,091</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>31,833</b>	<b>13</b>
West Bekaa	Lebanese	67,540	30,393	45	27,016	40	10,131	15	0	0	0	0	2	10,131	15
	Syrian ref.	51,504	7,726	15	25,752	50	18,026	35	0	0	0	0	3	18,026	35
	<b>Total</b>	<b>119,044</b>	<b>38,119</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>52,768</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>28,157</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>28,157</b>	<b>24</b>





District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Zahle	Lebanese	139,399	76,669	55	48,790	35	13,940	10	0	0	0	0	2	13,940	10
	Syrian ref.	129,834	19,475	15	64,917	50	45,442	35	0	0	0	0	3	45,442	35
	Total	269,233	96,145	36	113,707	42	59,382	22	0	0	0	0		59,382	22
Palestinian refugees	Palestinian refugees	231,515	57,879	25	104,182	45	57,879	25	11,576	5	0	0	3	69,455	30
	Total	231,515	57,879	25	104,182	45	57,879	25	11,576	5	0	0		69,455	30
Total	Lebanese	3,864,296	1,940,259	50	1,439,826	37	484,211	13	0	0	0	0		484,211	13
	Syrian ref.	1,000,000	205,706	21	517,355	51	275,604	28	1,335	0	0	0		276,939	28
	Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria	95,856	9,586	10	43,135	45	33,550	35	9,586	10	0	0		43,135	45
	Palestine ref.	231,515	57,879	25	104,182	45	57,879	25	11,576	5	0	0		69,455	30
	Grand Total	5,191,667	2,213,430	43	2,104,498	41	851,243	17	22,497	0	0	0		873,739	17

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, therefore they may need continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.

## CURRENT SITUATION OVERVIEW (NOVEMBER 2025 - MARCH 2026)

This IPC analysis covers four population groups: Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees, and post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria. It was conducted across 19 units of analysis for Lebanese residents (12 districts and seven clusters), 25 for Syrian refugees (24 districts and one cluster), one national unit for Palestine refugees, and three units for post-2024 arrivals (Akkar, Tripoli and the cluster of Baalbek & El Hermel). The analysis covered over 99 percent of the population living in the country and produced the IPC current (November 2025 to March 2026) and projected (April to September 2026) acute food insecurity phase classification.

Acute food insecurity has declined significantly compared to previous analyses. About 874,000 people (17 percent of the analysed population) are currently in IPC Phase 3 or above, down from 1.17 million (21 percent) in the projection period of April-June 2025 and 1.65 million in the period following the conflict peak in late 2024/early 2025. This reduction reflects a combination of factors:

- The November 2024 ceasefire largely holding and improved security, enabling large-scale returns (986,000 IDPs) and markets reopening.
- Market recovery, with the Market Functionality Index (MFI) reaching 7.8 nationally by September 2025, ensuring full availability and assortment of essential goods.
- Humanitarian assistance continuity, despite funding cuts, with actual coverage between April and September 2025 reaching 24 percent for Lebanese households and 53 percent for Syrian refugees, buffering vulnerable groups from food consumption gaps.
- Exchange rate stability and moderated inflation, with the LBP anchored at USD/LBP 89,700 and inflation easing to around 15 percent since late 2024, reducing volatility compared to previous years.
- Seasonal income opportunities, especially during the summer 2025 period, along with remittances, which provided temporary relief for some households.

However, food insecurity remains significant and uneven across Lebanon. While national indicators show an ease in food insecurity levels compared to the ones registered during the conflict, high-severity pockets persist in conflict-affected and vulnerable districts such as Baalbek, El Hermel, Akkar, Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh, and Sour, and among refugee populations. These areas continue to face structural and compounding challenges that undermine household resilience.

The lingering economic crisis remains a dominant driver, with unemployment at 27 percent in the period between April and October 2025 among Lebanese (WFP Real Time Monitoring), a large proportion of workers engaged in informal jobs, and limited recovery in agriculture and small-scale retail. Funding shortfalls for humanitarian assistance add further pressure: coverage is projected to fall to 20 percent for Lebanese households and 48 percent for Syrian refugees during the November 2025 till March 2026. Recovery efforts have also been slow. Despite the World Bank's LEAP loan, USD \$14 billion in conflict-related losses and widespread infrastructure damage remain largely unaddressed, constraining livelihoods and service delivery. Localised insecurity and displacement pressures persist, with 64,000 IDPs still displaced and more than 120,000 post-2024 arrivals, straining already overstretched services. Finally, high living costs and price unpredictability, particularly for non-food essentials, continue to erode purchasing power among vulnerable households.

**Lebanese residents:** Four of the 19 units of analysis are classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) in the current period. These include two districts (Akkar and El Minieh-Dennie) and two clusters (Baalbek & El Hermel, and Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun). One in four Lebanese residents are classified in Phase 3 in Akkar and Baalbek-Hermel. The highest occurrence of acute food insecurity (Phase 3 or above) is observed in the districts of Akkar (74,000) and Baabda (61,000), and the cluster of Baalbek & El Hermel (55,000). No Lebanese residents are classified as IPC Phase 4 (Emergency).

**Syrian refugees:** 19 of the 25 units of analysis are classified in Phase 3 for the current period, including 18 districts and the cluster of Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun. Four districts reported more than a third of the population in acute food insecurity, namely Baalbek (40 percent), El Hermel (35 percent), West Bekaa (35 percent), and Zahle (35 percent). Around 1,300 Syrian refugees are classified in Phase 4, located in El Nabatieh (1,000) and El Hermel (300). The highest number of Syrian refugees in acute food insecurity is observed in Zahle (45,000), Baalbek (45,000), and Akkar (43,000).

**Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria:** The post-2024 arrivals were analysed within three units of analysis, of which two districts (Akkar and Tripoli) and one cluster (Baalbek & El Hermel). In all three units of analysis, the post-2024 arrivals reported 33,500 people (35 percent) in Phase 3 and 9,500 (10 percent) in Phase 4 making it the population with the highest proportion of people in either acute food insecurity phases at national level. At the national level, a total of 43,000 post-2024 arrivals are classified in Phase 3 or above. The highest occurrence of acute food insecurity was reported in Baalbek & El Hermel, with 24,000 people in Phase 3 and 7,000 in Phase 4.

**Palestine refugees:** Palestine refugees in Lebanon (both residing in and outside camps) and Palestine refugees from Syria are analysed as a single unit of analysis at the national level. Like the last current analysis, around 30 percent of the Palestine refugee population are classified in Phase 3 or above, representing 69,000 people, including 25 percent (58,000 people) in Phase 3 and 5 percent (12,000 people) in Phase 4. Palestine refugees have the highest occurrence of Phase 4 at the national level (12,000 people) among all analysed population groups.



## CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO FOOD INSECURITY

Nearly a year after the November 2024 ceasefire, Lebanon has achieved relative security and political stabilisation, but recovery remains slow and uneven. The election of a new president and formation of a government in January 2025 ended a two-year political vacuum and brought initial reform pledges, supported by a roadmap for governance and fiscal reforms. However, despite these steps, structural challenges persist, reconstruction financing is limited, and broader reforms have stalled amid political tensions and entrenched interests. Combined with the lingering economic crisis, high poverty rates, and localised infrastructure damage, these factors continue to undermine household resilience and drive food insecurity across vulnerable communities.

### Slow path to recovery despite ceasefire

The physical and economic impact of the conflict between October 2023 and November 2024 remains severe. While the November 2024 ceasefire agreement significantly restored security conditions and reopened access routes, allowing markets and basic services to resume in many areas, in turn helping to stabilise food availability and reduce acute food insecurity compared to the conflict peak, recovery efforts remain weak and uneven.

Fourteen months of hostilities caused extensive destruction of homes, farms, and infrastructure—particularly in southern and eastern Lebanon. Agricultural recovery is slow: while some orchards are accessible again, irrigation systems, feeder roads, and storage facilities remain damaged. Clearing rubble and unexploded ordnance continues to delay full restoration of livelihoods.

The World Bank's Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimates USD \$14 billion in total losses and USD \$11 billion in recovery needs, including USD \$1.1 billion for critical infrastructure and USD \$412 million for agriculture and food systems. Despite these staggering figures, large-scale reconstruction has not begun. The only significant step so far is the USD \$250 million World Bank loan signed in August 2025 under the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Project (LEAP), a framework designed to scale up to USD \$1 billion with additional donor contributions. LEAP focuses on urgent priorities such as rubble management and repairs to roads, water, electricity, schools, and health facilities over the next 18–24 months.

Beyond this initial financing, no major recovery programs have materialized. The gap between needs and available resources remains vast, leaving conflict-affected communities reliant on humanitarian aid. Accelerating LEAP implementation and securing further international support will be critical to move from emergency response toward inclusive, climate-resilient reconstruction.

### Displacement

The November 2024 ceasefire enabled large-scale returns, with 986,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) back in their communities by October 2025. Despite this progress, 64,000 people remain displaced, mainly in El Nabatieh, Sour, Aley, Saïda, and Bent Jbeil. Reintegration is challenging with damaged housing, depleted resources, and limited access to essential services such as water, health, and education continue to constrain recovery.

Housing patterns have shifted toward rentals, with 85 percent of displaced households renting, while co-living with host families dropped to 3 percent. This trend reflects greater stability but also higher costs, adding pressure on household budgets and host communities, particularly in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and Bekaa, where rental markets remain strained. Although most IDPs have exited collective shelters, housing vulnerabilities persist. Overcrowding affects about 4 percent of individuals in host settings, while reliance on collective sites remains prevalent in the governorates of north (73 percent of displaced staying in the governorate) and Beirut (11 percent). The recent cross-border movements from Syria—representing the post-2024 arrival—have further intensified pressure on services and community-level tensions, with over 120,000 arrivals since early 2025, concentrated in the districts of Tripoli, Akkar, Baalbek, and El Hermel. This group faces particular vulnerabilities, including the highest share of households in Phase 3 or above, strong dependence on humanitarian assistance, and restricted mobility in some urban areas such as Tripoli's Jabal Mohsen neighborhood. While precise shelter figures remain limited, preliminary assessment insights indicate precarious housing and limited coping mechanisms. The combined effects of protracted displacement, incomplete recovery, and rising competition for assistance remain key drivers of vulnerability and food insecurity, especially in areas of return and high refugee presence.

## Lingering economic crisis and inflationary pressures

Lebanon's economic crisis remains a significant driver of food insecurity. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is estimated to have contracted by 7.1 percent in 2024, as a result of the 2023-2024 conflict, bringing the cumulative decline since 2019 to 40 percent, one of the steepest globally. The World Bank projects GDP growth of 3.5 percent in 2025, revised down from 4.7 percent due to regional tensions and slow reform progress.

For households, the crisis translates into shrinking purchasing power, rising service and transport costs, and persistent reliance on a cash-based, dollarised economy. Inflation, while lower than the triple-digit levels of previous years, remains a constraint: general year-on-year inflation stood at 15 percent and year-on-year food inflation at 24 percent as of September 2025. However, as inflation is now measured in USD terms, these figures represent real increases in dollar prices. For households paid in LBP or with limited dollar access, purchasing power remains severely strained. Even with improved macro-stability, inflation at these levels remains high by global standards and continue to erode living conditions.

Despite this macro-level stabilisation, household costs continue to rise. The Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) for a family of five reached USD \$509 in September 2025, up 16 percent year-on-year, while the food SMEB rose 12 percent to reach USD \$40.4 per person. Non-food essentials—such as electricity, healthcare, and rent—have increased by 19 percent, adding pressure on vulnerable households reliant on humanitarian assistance or informal labour.

Vulnerable groups, including low-income Lebanese, Syrian refugees, and Palestine refugees, face the greatest strain. Without accelerated reforms and targeted recovery investments, economic fragility will continue to undermine food security throughout 2025 and the beginning of 2026.

## Market situation

Lebanon's markets have demonstrated remarkable resilience and recovery since the ceasefire, with functionality now similar to pre-crisis levels. The national Market Functionality Index (MFI)—a quantitative measure of the functioning of markets based on a shop retailers survey, which assigns a score across different dimensions (availability, assortment, prices, supply resilience/conditions) between zero (low functionality) and ten (high functionality)—reached 7.8 out of 10 (high functionality) in September 2025, only slightly below its May peak of 8.3, confirming strong overall performance. Shops nationwide report full assortment and availability of essential goods, and resilience indicators remain at their highest levels, reflecting robust supply chains and reliable delivery capacity. Price predictability has improved significantly compared to late 2024, even though some volatility persists in non-cereal food items. Mount Lebanon governorate continues to score an overall MFI score of 10, while Beirut remains high at 8.3, underscoring strong market stability in key urban centres. While Baalbek-El Hermel governorate and other peripheral areas show moderate scores, these regions have maintained steady progress since early 2025.

Operationality remains high, with 82 percent of shops functional in September, and most closures linked to financial constraints rather than structural issues. Supply chains are increasingly diversified, reducing dependence on single suppliers and strengthening market resilience. Local sourcing remains strong in the governorates of South and El Nabatieh, ensuring continuity even under logistical pressures.

Overall, Lebanon's markets have transitioned from emergency recovery to stable functionality, enabling a more reliable physical access of households for essential goods. Continued attention to price stabilization and support for small retailers will help sustain these gains and further enhance food security. At the same time, localised disparities, such as higher transport costs and occasional price volatility in governorates such as Akkar, North, Baalbek-El Hermel, Bekaa, El Nabatieh and South, still affect purchasing power for the most vulnerable. Addressing these gaps through targeted interventions will be key to ensuring that the strong national recovery translates into equitable access for all households.

## Job opportunities

Lebanon's labour market remains under severe strain despite signs of macroeconomic stabilisation. The combined effects of the protracted economic crisis and the 2023-2024 conflict have disrupted formal employment, accelerated the shift toward informal and insecure work, and reduced income-generating opportunities across key sectors. Access to stable livelihoods continues to be a major determinant of household food security, particularly for displaced populations and low-income groups.

Employment trends remain fragile. WFP's mVAM real-time monitoring (RTM) data indicates that between April and October 2025 employment rates among individuals aged 18–64 averaged 49 percent. Unemployment<sup>1</sup> among Lebanese averaged 27 percent, while gender disparities persist with only 28 percent of women being employed compared to 76 percent of men, while female unemployment reached 46 percent, more than triple that of their male counterparts (14 percent).

Informal labour continues to dominate the recovery landscape, offering limited income stability or protection. Daily wage and seasonal employment opportunities, while providing short-term relief, are insufficient to meet the rising cost of living, particularly given increasing competition from displaced populations and refugees. Without broader economic recovery initiatives and targeted employment programs, households continue to face precarious livelihood situations, sustaining their vulnerability to food insecurity.

### Slow, uneven progress on political reform

Lebanon entered 2025 with renewed institutional momentum following the presidential election in January and the formation of a government in February, ending a prolonged political vacuum since 2022. Vacancies in several key security and administrative positions were filled throughout the first half of the year helping restore basic governance functionality. While these developments improved confidence and reactivated policy dialogue, including an IMF fact-finding mission in September 2025, progress toward a full recovery program remains limited. The IMF noted modest steps under the provisional reform plan but emphasized that deeper structural reforms are still required. Municipal elections were held in May 2025, and debate over the 2026 electoral framework continues, alongside preparations for an investment conference announced for late 2025.

Despite this progress, no major structural reforms have materialized in the banking sector or in capital control legislation. Restrictions on bank deposits continue without a legal framework, while the cash-based economy—now exceeding 60 percent of GDP—has expanded the role of money transfer operators (MTOs) in financial transactions. Persistent liquidity constraints and unresolved banking losses, estimated at USD \$70 billion, continue to hinder recovery. The country's placement on the FATF grey list (October 2024) and EU blacklist (July 2025) further complicates international transactions and investor confidence.

### Deteriorated livelihoods of farmers

Lebanon's agricultural households continue to face mounting challenges in sustaining their livelihoods amid a fragile post-conflict recovery and prolonged economic instability. FAO DIEM 2025 Data in Emergencies Monitoring brief round 8 results indicate that roughly 17,000 agricultural households across the country require urgent emergency agricultural assistance, with most of those in need concentrated in the governorates of El Nabatieh (47 percent), Baalbek-El Hermel (22 percent), and South (15 percent), where recurrent conflict, market disruptions, and input scarcity have sharply constrained production capacity. In addition, water scarcity and deteriorated irrigation networks have further hindered production, particularly among smallholders with limited adaptive capacity. Consequently, an estimated 213,000 people, including 43,000 agricultural households, have been directly affected by reduced water availability, delayed planting, and crop losses.

The conflict caused an estimated USD \$704 million in agricultural damages and losses, including USD \$118 million in damages and USD \$586 million in losses, mostly concentrated in the south and El Nabatieh governorates. Total recovery and reconstruction needs are estimated at USD \$263 million, of which USD \$95 million are prioritised for 2025–2026, focusing on agricultural input support, crop and livestock rehabilitation, and the promotion of sustainable, climate-smart recovery. Immediate emergency assistance of USD \$32 million is required to resume agricultural and livestock production, while USD \$135 million is needed for the reconstruction of agricultural assets and infrastructure.

Around half of all agricultural households saw their main income fall, according to the FAO DIEM 2025 Data in Emergencies Monitoring brief round 8 results, with losses particularly acute among smallholders and those reliant on mixed or livestock production. Agricultural stressors remain severe: 13 percent of vulnerable farmers reduced their planted area and 78 percent recorded lower harvests compared with the previous year. Similarly, 89 percent of livestock producers faced rearing difficulties, and 85 percent struggled to sell their products due to market and mobility restrictions.

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<sup>1</sup> calculated using the ILO relaxed definition

Despite the scale of vulnerability, fewer than half of affected households received any food security assistance in the past six months. Among those who did, the vast majority received food aid, while only a small proportion benefited from agricultural or cash support. Looking ahead, farmers prioritised crop inputs (74 percent), cash assistance (70 percent), and livestock feed (10 percent) as their most urgent needs to sustain production and prevent further erosion of livelihoods. These findings underscore the pressing need for timely, geographically targeted agricultural support to restore productive capacity and stabilise food security in the most affected districts of southern and eastern Lebanon.

### Risk of rising malnutrition

The nutrition situation remains concerning, particularly among vulnerable population groups including children under five and displaced Syrian households, although no significant deterioration has been observed compared with previous years. According to wasting surveillance data collected and analysed throughout 2025 by the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in collaboration with the Nutrition Sector, the national Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate stands at 1.9 percent (within “very low <2.5 percent” range as per WHO thresholds), indicating a stable situation at the national level. However, marked disparities persist across geographical areas and population groups. Of the 1,350 children admitted to community and facility-based wasting management programmes in 2025, 65 percent were Syrian refugees, 32 percent Lebanese, and approximately 1 percent migrants, with the highest admission rates reported in Akkar, Tripoli, Zahleh, and Baalbek. Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) practices remain suboptimal, with limited access to diverse and nutrient-rich foods among households facing economic vulnerability. Findings from the 2025 national IYCF rapid assessment indicate that only 13.5 percent of 9,752 children met the minimum dietary diversity threshold. On the other hand, maternal nutrition surveillance data from MoPH similarly indicate a 3 percent GAM rate (within “low 2.5 to <5 percent” range as per WHO thresholds), among pregnant and breastfeeding women, with district-level trends mirroring those observed in children—highest in Akkar, followed by Tripoli and Baalbeck—with 67 percent of identified cases among Syrian refugees and 32 percent among Lebanese women. Although acute malnutrition levels remain below the emergency threshold, localised pockets of concern are evident in areas with limited-service availability and high poverty prevalence, notably North, Akkar, and Baalbek-El Hermel. Continued surveillance and targeted preventive and therapeutic nutrition interventions are required to mitigate deterioration risks, particularly in light of recent funding reductions that have led to scale-back of partner-implemented nutrition programmes and reduced service coverage.

### Food systems and domestic food supply

Lebanon remains heavily dependent on imports for staple foods, with domestic agricultural production insufficient to meet national demand. According to the FAO GIEWS update (August 2025), national cereal production for 2025 is estimated at about 90,000 tonnes—nearly 50 percent below the pre-crisis average—marking one of the weakest harvests in recent years. Localised conflict during 2024–25 disrupted agricultural activities in key producing areas, while extreme dryness and record-low rainfall, over 50 percent below average in the Bekaa and Baalbek-El Hermel governorates, further depressed yields. Rising input costs for seeds, fertilisers, and pesticides, combined with low farmer incomes and widespread displacement during the planting season, have reduced both cultivated area and yield. This limited farmers’ ability to rebuild on-farm stocks ahead of the 2024-2025 season and reinforced dependence on continuous wheat imports to meet consumption needs. The production of other key staples such as potatoes, vegetables and pulses has likewise been impacted by repeated displacement, damage to irrigation systems and greenhouses, and rising fuel and input costs. These resulted in reduced planted areas, lower yields, and in some locations, the temporary abandonment of plots in the Bekaa and southern coastal areas.

Fruits and perennial crop production in 2025 remains under marked stress rather than showing a broad recovery. Publicly available field reporting and assessments indicate that the 2025 olive season is among the weakest in years, with some observers describing production drops of up to 80 percent in certain areas, largely driven by prolonged drought, extreme heat, erratic rainfall and the high cost of irrigation, labour and plant protection in addition to direct conflict damage (ANERA). An exceptionally dry 2024-2025 hydrological year has further constrained water availability for grapes, citrus and open field as well as greenhouse vegetables, with farmer representatives in the Bekaa and the South explicitly flagging wheat, grapes, tomatoes and citrus among the most affected crops.

## Social tensions

Tensions between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees have remained high through 2025, driven by competition over limited resources and services. Refugees continue to face unequal access to public shelters and government assistance, compounded by discriminatory attitudes in some host areas. The continued influx of new arrivals from western Syria has further strained local capacities, particularly in the northern and eastern governorates. Beyond refugee-related tensions, localised community insecurity linked to smuggling, theft, drug trafficking, and the presence of non-state armed actors persists in border and peripheral areas where state control remains weak. The government's disarmament efforts have also heightened political friction, occasionally triggering local flashpoints in already fragile communities.

## FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES

### Food consumption

The Food Consumption Score (FCS) assesses the adequacy and diversity of household diets based on the frequency of consumption of key food groups. Households are classified as having acceptable, borderline, or poor consumption, with borderline and poor categories reflecting insufficient dietary diversity and limited intake of nutrient-dense foods—often signalling pressure on food access and reduced financial capacity.

For Lebanese households, mid-2025 data (mVAM – April to September 2025) point to broadly stable dietary outcomes, with 87 percent reporting acceptable consumption and 13 percent classified as borderline or poor. While this represents a slight deterioration relative to early 2025, it confirms that the food consumption of Lebanese residents have largely maintained the gains observed following the reduction in hostilities in late 2024. However, geographic disparities remain: the prevalence of inadequate diets is highest in Akkar (25 percent), El Minieh–Dennie (19 percent), and Tripoli (18 percent), whereas levels are significantly lower in Keserwan & Jbeil (5 percent), Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun (5 percent), and El Meten (7 percent). These patterns mirror broader regional inequalities in income recovery, access to food assistance, and market accessibility.

Among Syrian refugee households, food consumption outcomes show overall improvement compared with 2024, but a slight deterioration from early 2025. As of mid-2025 (VaSyr), 31 percent of Syrian refugee households reported borderline or poor FCS (including 5 percent poor), slightly worse than the levels recorded in March 2025 but still markedly better than the situation in 2024, when nearly four in ten households had inadequate diets. The most critical levels of inadequate consumption are observed in the northern districts of Zgharta (59 percent), El Batroun (58 percent), Tripoli (58 percent), and El Koura (56 percent), with poor consumption reaching 23 percent in Zgharta and 19 percent in both El Batroun and El Koura. The southern district of Jezzine also saw a high prevalence of poor consumption (22 percent). Even in areas with comparatively better income opportunities—such as Beirut, Aley, or El Meten—diet adequacy remains fragile, reflecting sustained economic pressures and limited access to diversified food.

The results of the Emergency Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment (EFSVA) collected between July and September 2025 show that the dietary outcomes among the post-2024 arrivals are even more severe. Around half of post-2024 arrivals households report borderline or poor food consumption across Baalbek & El Hermel (54 percent), Akkar (46 percent), and Tripoli (46 percent), with one in five households reporting poor FCS levels in each unit of analysis. These high levels reflect the acute vulnerability associated with recent displacement, including the loss of previous livelihoods, absence of assets, and limited access to assistance networks upon arrival.

Dietary patterns among Palestine refugees (UNRWA – August 2025) remain strained, with 34 percent of households having inadequate consumption (26 percent borderline, 8 percent poor), broadly consistent with previous rounds. While more favourable than outcomes observed among post-2024 arrivals, these figures confirm persistent dietary stress and chronic structural vulnerability among Palestine refugee communities.

## Coping strategies

The Reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI) quantifies the frequency and severity of consumption-based coping behaviours, serving as a key indicator of stress on household food access and the extent to which families are able to maintain an acceptable level of food consumption without resorting to negative strategies.

For Lebanese residents, consumption-based coping patterns have largely stabilised, with 54 percent of households classified as using no or low coping strategies and 11 percent resorting to high or severe coping in September 2025—similar to the improvement observed in March 2025. This confirms that the gains achieved following the end of hostilities have largely been sustained through mid-2025. However, regional differences persist with higher reliance on severe coping is observed in El Minieh-Dennie (19 percent), Akkar (17 percent), Baalbek & El Hermel (16 percent), and West Bekaa (16 percent), compared with markedly lower levels in Keserwan & Jbeil (4 percent) and Saida (5 percent). These disparities reflect uneven recovery in access to food across governorates.

Syrian refugee households continue to face elevated coping pressures. As of June 2025, 25 percent of Syrian refugee households nationwide reported high or severe coping, 54 percent moderate coping, and only 21 percent no or low coping. Despite progress since 2022, reliance on severe coping remains widespread, particularly in areas with high refugee concentration or limited assistance coverage. The highest levels of high coping are found in Saida (75 percent), Jbeil (52 percent), Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun (47 percent), and Hasbaya (41 percent)—indicating acute stress among households in the South and parts of the Bekaa and Mount Lebanon.

Coping behaviour among the post-2024 arrivals is even more severe, reflecting the acute vulnerabilities associated with recent displacement. In Baalbek & El Hermel, 38 percent of post-2024 arrivals reported high or severe coping, compared to 29 percent in Tripoli and 26 percent in Akkar. These findings point to critical stress in northern and northeastern areas where post-2024 arrivals face limited livelihood opportunities and heightened competition for resources with host and longer-settled refugee communities.

Among Palestine refugees, coping levels remain persistently high: 14 percent of households report high coping, 53 percent moderate, and 33 percent no or low coping. While these figures are broadly consistent with previous rounds, they highlight ongoing vulnerability and limited recovery among Palestine refugees compared to Lebanese households.

## Livelihood coping strategies

Livelihood coping strategies reflect the extent to which households modify income-earning activities or resort to actions—such as asset liquidation—that undermine future resilience. The Livelihood Coping Strategy Index (LCSI) classifies these behaviours into stress, crisis, and emergency strategies.

Lebanese households show broadly stable livelihood coping patterns in mid-2025, with 56 percent reporting no coping—an improvement compared with 2024 and consistent with stabilization observed in early 2025. Around 31 percent employ stress strategies and 13 percent rely on crisis or emergency coping, with emergency strategies remaining very low (1 percent). However, geographic disparities are notable: the highest levels of critical coping (crisis or emergency) appear at 18 percent in Akkar, Baalbek & El Hermel, and Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun (18 percent). In contrast, levels are much lower in El Batroun & El Koura (7 percent), El Meten (7 percent), Beirut (8 percent), and Saida (8 percent), reflecting unequal livelihood recovery across regions.

Syrian refugees, however, display a more complex trajectory. By mid-2025, critical coping had fallen back to 26 percent, indicating an improvement from the March peak (36 percent) but no net gain compared with 2024 (26 percent). The current distribution—22 percent of households using crisis strategies and 4 percent emergency strategies—continues to signal significant pressure on livelihoods, even as conditions stabilize relative to early 2025. Marked geographic disparities persist: extremely high levels of critical coping are recorded at 39 percent in Baalbek, El Nabatieh, and Zahle, and at 37 percent in El Hermel. The presence of emergency coping—highest in El Nabatieh (24 percent), Saida (9 percent), and West Bekaa (9 percent)—indicates severe and ongoing stress in areas where refugees face limited income opportunities and reduced assistance coverage.

Livelihood coping among the post-2024 arrivals offers an equally severe picture. More than half of post-2024 arrivals in Baalbek & El Hermel (57 percent) and a third of households in Akkar and Tripoli (32 percent each) rely on crisis or emergency strategies,



with emergency coping reaching 9 percent in Tripoli, 6 percent in Baalbek & El Hermel, and 4 percent in Akkar. The extremely high share of crisis coping in Baalbek & El Hermel (51 percent) underscores the acute vulnerability associated with recent displacement, the loss of assets, and limited access to regular livelihood opportunities.

For Palestine refugees, LCS data from August 2025 reveal persistent stress on household resilience. Only 32 percent report no coping, while 56 percent rely on stress strategies and 12 percent engage in crisis or emergency strategies (including 5 percent emergency). These patterns highlight the chronic livelihood constraints faced by this population group.

## SOCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Humanitarian Food Security Assistance (HFSA) surged in the aftermath of the late-2024 conflict, reaching 32 percent of Lebanese households and 63 percent of Syrian refugees by December 2024, helping stabilise food security and prevent widespread deterioration. As the ceasefire took hold, agencies shifted to supporting returnees and host communities through cash and in-kind assistance. This scale-up resulted in the reduction of Phase 3 or above prevalence during early 2025.

Despite severe funding shortfalls in early 2025, Food Security and Agriculture Sector (FSAC) partners sustained critical support, which, alongside improved market access and seasonal income, helped drive the reduction in Phase 3 or above prevalence observed in the current analysis. Between April and September 2025, actual assistance coverage averaged 24 percent for Lebanese households and 53 percent for Syrian refugees, higher than initially projected in the previous analysis (11 percent for Lebanese in the projection period of July-October 2025 and 45 percent for Syrian refugees in the same analysis projection period). This continuity of aid was essential to maintaining food consumption among vulnerable groups during a period of economic strain.

Looking ahead, humanitarian food assistance coverage is projected to decline, with 20 percent of Lebanese households expected to receive support during the November 2025 till March 2026 period, covering half of daily caloric needs. For Syrian refugee, coverage is estimated at 48 percent during the same period, providing 50 percent of daily energy needs. For the next projection period (April–July 2026), coverage is forecast to drop to 19 percent for Lebanese households and just 4 percent for Syrian refugees, a figure that reflects only the caseload for which funding has been confirmed for April 2026. At the time of analysis, no funding is secured for Syrian refugee assistance beyond April 2026, raising serious concerns about continuity of support.

These anticipated reductions come at a critical juncture: while assistance has already fallen sharply from the surge in late 2024, it remains a lifeline for vulnerable households. The sharp contraction in coverage risks reversing recent gains achieved through sustained humanitarian efforts and improved market conditions. Many households currently classified in Phase 2 could deteriorate into Phase 3 without predictable funding and contingency planning. Ensuring multi-month commitments and prioritising high-severity areas will be essential to prevent a resurgence of acute food insecurity.

## A GENDERED LENS ON FOOD INSECURITY IN LEBANON

Food insecurity in Lebanon is material, gendered, and relational, driven by structural inequalities, crises, disruption of services and infrastructure gaps, and institutional collapse. While the IPC analysis provides crucial insights and classification of food security at household levels across the 26 districts in Lebanon, it adopts household-level indicators often overlooking individual-level experiences, and gender dynamics that govern how food security impacts women, men, girls, boys, older individuals, and People with Disabilities (PwDs) differently. To tackle this gap, Oxfam in Lebanon has implemented a pilot study<sup>2</sup> in five districts (Baabda, El Meten, Zahle, Baalbek, and Akkar), between February 2024 and November 2025, to explore gender dynamics in food security and increase gender-sensitivity in the understanding of coping and vulnerability patterns and IPC analyses. The main pilot phases are as follows:

### PHASE 1

Quantitative Study with women and men headed households in five districts  
(Aug-Dec 2024)

### PHASE 2

Complementary Qualitative Study with women and men headed households in the same five districts  
(May-Jul 2025)

### PHASE 3

Final Study of quantitative and qualitative aspects including detailed findings  
(Aug 2025)

### PHASE 4

Policy Brief detailing recommendations and policy asks  
(Oct 2025)

## Headline findings

**Intrahousehold food security is highly gendered:** Women, particularly mothers and mothers of young children, are consistently the first to reduce portions, skip meals, or pretend they have eaten, framing these acts as moral or maternal duties. These sacrifices are embedded in a broader gendered moral economy where nutritional priority is implicitly structured.

Diet quality among women is critically low: only about 20 percent of women aged 18–49 met the Minimum Dietary Diversity for Women (MDD-W) threshold. Working women were nearly twice as likely to meet the MDD-W standard (30 percent compared with 16 percent), and women living in households with a working head had better outcomes as well (26 percent versus 8 percent).

Women ‘manage’ food, shopping, rationing, cooking, yet often lack control over income, leading to responsibility without authority. Joint decisions exist, but scarcity narrows choice; “what’s available” trumps preferences or norms.

**Household stress is chronic:** Across Lebanese and Syrian households, women are at the forefront of adapting to food insecurity through often invisible acts of austerity. They substitute nutrient-rich foods with starches, stretch meals creatively, and reduce their own intake to shield their families from hunger.

Quantitatively, 26 percent of respondents reported a poor or borderline Food Consumption Score (FCS) while 37 percent scored high on the Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI). Additionally, 15 percent reported adopting Livelihood Coping Strategies (LCS) or Food Security (FS) emergency strategies and the average Food Expenditure Share (FES) was 38 percent. At this level, coping is not a temporary adaptation—it risks locking households into cycles of harm, including malnutrition, debt and protection risks.

**Shifting gender roles and masculinities:** In the absence of affordable childcare, maintenance, or social support, women have become teachers, repair workers, and informal social workers, with some Lebanese women interviewed taking on carpentry and plumbing out of necessity. This unpaid labor remains largely invisible, reinforcing the re-domestication of women’s time, energy, and agency.

Some men report feeling shame when they cannot fulfill their traditional role as providers due to unemployment or financial hardship. Some try to renegotiate their roles within the household (taking over children’s school drop-offs or market errands). Changes, though, are fragile, and bear a temporary or unstable nature because of social norms or personal discomfort.

Economic insecurity is also reshaping adolescent girls’ roles in low-income and WHHs, with increased domestic responsibilities leading to school dropout and early adultification.

<sup>1</sup> A Gendered Lens of Food Security in Lebanon: <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/gendered-lens-food-security-lebanon>


**War and infrastructure failure reshape access:** Bombardment, blocked routes, diesel and water scarcity undermine planting/harvests and cold chains; urban renters lack fallbacks and face eviction risk. Cultural and social dimensions also shape coping strategies. Food is tied to identity, memory, pride, and dignity. In a displacement context, accepting unfamiliar food can contribute to impacting one's sense of belonging and overall wellbeing


**Mental health impacts and emotional labour:** Mental fatigue, emotional withdrawal, and psychosocial stress emerged across all groups, especially among mothers, caregivers, and the elderly. Mental health was not framed as taboo; participants spoke openly about its toll and its intergenerational effects, including physical health deterioration.


Mental Health burdens are widespread among caregivers and youth, tied to loss of food rituals and hospitality. Beyond physical deprivation, food insecurity erodes dignity, shared rituals, and identity. The inability to serve guests, share meals, or uphold hospitality customs was described as a cultural injury, reframing hunger as both social and symbolic rupture.


Lastly, the study finds food insecurity to be dynamic and manifests in manners that are often unmeasurable through quantitative tools. Men view the failure to provide food as loss of dignity; women shoulder the shame of debt and small loans while caregiving responsibilities bring fatigue and anxiety. It is crucial that all these aspects are explored and integrated into an effective and inclusive food insecurity response that centers the unique needs and challenges of all different individuals.


## PROJECTION SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (APRIL – JULY 2026)

LEBANESE RESIDENTS PROJECTED AFI: April - July 2026	
 <b>493,000</b> 13% of the population analysed  People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)  IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5 <b>0</b> People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4 <b>0</b> People in Emergency
	Phase 3 <b>493,000</b> People in Crisis
	Phase 2 <b>1,430,000</b> People in Stressed
	Phase 1 <b>1,942,000</b> People in Food Security

SYRIAN REFUGEES PROJECTED AFI: April - July 2026	
 <b>334,000</b> 34% of the population analysed  People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)  IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5 <b>0</b> People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4 <b>37,000</b> People in Emergency
	Phase 3 <b>297,000</b> People in Crisis
	Phase 2 <b>461,000</b> People in Stressed
	Phase 1 <b>205,000</b> People in Food Security

PALESTINE REFUGEES PROJECTED AFI: April - July 2026	
 <b>81,000</b> 35% of the population analysed  People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)  IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5 <b>0</b> People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4 <b>12,000</b> People in Emergency
	Phase 3 <b>69,000</b> People in Crisis
	Phase 2 <b>93,000</b> People in Stressed
	Phase 1 <b>58,000</b> People in Food Security

POST-DECEMBER 2024 ARRIVALS FROM SYRIA PROJECTED AFI: April - July 2026	
 <b>53,000</b> 55% of the population analysed  People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)  IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5 <b>0</b> People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4 <b>14,000</b> People in Emergency
	Phase 3 <b>38,000</b> People in Crisis
	Phase 2 <b>34,000</b> People in Stressed
	Phase 1 <b>10,000</b> People in Food Security





## POPULATION TABLE FOR THE PROJECTION PERIOD (APRIL - JULY 2026)

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Akkar	Lebanese	296,722	74,181	25	148,361	50	74,181	25	0	0	0	0	3	74,181	25
	Syrian ref.	143,121	21,468	15	64,404	45	42,936	30	14,312	10	0	0	3	57,248	40
	Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria	16,661	1,666	10	5,831	35	6,664	40	2,499	15	0	0	3	9,164	55
	Total	456,504	97,315	21	218,597	48	123,781	27	16,811	4	0	0		140,592	31
Aley	Lebanese	215,290	118,410	55	75,352	35	21,529	10	0	0	0	0	2	21,529	10
	Syrian ref.	64,105	19,232	30	32,053	50	12,821	20	0	0	0	0	3	12,821	20
	Total	279,395	137,641	49	107,404	38	34,350	12	0	0	0	0		34,350	12
Baabda	Lebanese	408,641	183,888	45	163,456	40	61,296	15	0	0	0	0	2	61,296	15
	Syrian ref.	105,351	26,338	25	47,408	45	31,605	30	0	0	0	0	3	31,605	30
	Total	513,992	210,226	41	210,864	41	92,901	18	0	0	0	0		92,901	18
Baalbe & El Hermel	Baalbek & El Hermel Lebanese	220,695	66,209	30	99,313	45	55,174	25	0	0	0	0	3	55,174	25
	Baalbek Syrian ref.	5,342	534	10	2,404	45	2,137	40	267	5	0	0	3	2,404	45
	El Hermel Syrian ref.	112,272	11,227	10	50,522	45	44,909	40	5,614	5	0	0	3	50,522	45
	Baalbek-Hermel post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria	68,288	6,829	10	23,901	35	27,315	40	10,243	15	0	0	3	37,558	55
	Total	406,597	84,799	21	176,140	43	129,535	32	16,124	4	0	0		145,658	36
Bcharre & Zgharta	Bcharre & Zgharta Lebanese	93,544	60,804	65	28,063	30	4,677	5	0	0	0	0	2	4,677	5
	Bcharre Syrian ref.	1,191	417	35	596	50	179	15	0	0	0	0	2	179	15
	Zgharta Syrian ref.	12,217	3,665	30	4,887	40	3,665	30	0	0	0	0	3	3,665	30
	Total	106,952	64,886	61	33,546	31	8,521	8	0	0	0	0		8,521	8
Beirut	Lebanese	237,027	165,919	70	59,257	25	11,851	5	0	0	0	0	2	11,851	5
	Syrian ref.	31,875	9,563	30	15,938	50	6,375	20	0	0	0	0	3	6,375	20
	Total	268,902	175,481	65	75,194	28	18,226	7	0	0	0	0		18,226	7
Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun	Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun Lebanese	83,599	25,080	30	41,800	50	16,720	20	0	0	0	0	3	16,720	20
	Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun Syrian ref.	12,718	2,544	20	6,359	50	3,180	25	636	5	0	0	3	3,815	30
	Total	96,317	27,623	29	48,159	50	19,899	21	636	1	0	0		20,535	21
Chouf & Jezzine	Chouf & Jezzine Lebanese	235,529	129,541	55	82,435	35	23,553	10	0	0	0	0	2	23,553	10
	Chouf Syrian ref.	46,343	11,586	25	23,172	50	11,586	25	0	0	0	0	3	11,586	25
	Jezzine Syrian ref.	2,664	666	25	1,332	50	666	25	0	0	0	0	3	666	25
	Total	284,536	141,793	50	106,939	38	35,805	13	0	0	0	0		35,805	13

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
El Batroun & El Koura	El Batroun & El Koura Lebanese	125,245	87,672	70	37,574	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
	El Batroun Syrian ref.	12,163	3,041	25	6,082	50	3,041	25	0	0	0	0	3	3,041	25
	El Koura Syrian ref.	14,958	2,992	20	7,479	50	4,487	30	0	0	0	0	3	4,487	30
	<b>Total</b>	<b>152,366</b>	<b>93,704</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>51,134</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>7,528</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>7,528</b>	<b>5</b>
El Meten	Lebanese	396,657	277,660	70	99,164	25	19,833	5	0	0	0	0	2	19,833	5
	Syrian ref.	52,175	18,261	35	23,479	45	10,435	20	0	0	0	0	3	10,435	20
	<b>Total</b>	<b>448,832</b>	<b>295,921</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>122,643</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>30,268</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>30,268</b>	<b>7</b>
El Minieh-Dennie	Lebanese	121,534	48,614	40	48,614	40	24,307	20	0	0	0	0	3	24,307	20
	Syrian ref.	44,509	8,902	20	20,029	45	13,353	30	2,225	5	0	0	3	15,578	35
	<b>Total</b>	<b>166,043</b>	<b>57,515</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>68,643</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>37,660</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>2,225</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>39,885</b>	<b>24</b>
El Nabatieh	Lebanese	206,128	61,838	30	103,064	50	41,226	20	0	0	0	0	3	41,226	20
	Syrian ref.	21,367	3,205	15	10,684	50	6,410	30	1,068	5	0	0	3	7,478	35
	<b>Total</b>	<b>227,495</b>	<b>65,043</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>113,748</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>47,636</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>1,068</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>48,704</b>	<b>21</b>
Hasbaya & Rachaya	Hasbaya & Rachaya Lebanese	56,688	34,013	60	17,006	30	5,669	10	0	0	0	0	2	5,669	10
	Hasbaya Syrian ref.	3,443	1,549	45	861	25	861	25	172	5	0	0	3	1,033	30
	Rachaya Syrian ref.	3,973	596	15	2,384	60	795	20	199	5	0	0	3	993	25
	<b>Total</b>	<b>64,104</b>	<b>36,158</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>20,251</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>7,324</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>371</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>7,695</b>	<b>12</b>
Jbeil & Kesrwane	Jbeil & Kesrwane Lebanese	344,933	241,453	70	86,233	25	17,247	5	0	0	0	0	2	17,247	5
	Jbeil Syrian ref.	10,733	2,683	25	5,903	55	2,147	20	0	0	0	0	3	2,147	20
	Kesrwane Syrian ref.	19,437	6,803	35	8,747	45	3,887	20	0	0	0	0	3	3,887	20
	<b>Total</b>	<b>375,103</b>	<b>250,939</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>100,883</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>23,281</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>23,281</b>	<b>6</b>
Saida	Lebanese	233,189	104,935	45	93,276	40	34,978	15	0	0	0	0	2	34,978	15
	Syrian ref.	43,785	8,757	20	19,703	45	13,136	30	2,189	5	0	0	3	15,325	35
	<b>Total</b>	<b>276,974</b>	<b>113,692</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>112,979</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>48,114</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>2,189</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>50,303</b>	<b>18</b>
Sour	Lebanese	181,467	54,440	30	90,734	50	36,293	20	0	0	0	0	3	36,293	20
	Syrian ref.	27,408	6,852	25	12,334	45	8,222	30	0	0	0	0	3	8,222	30
	<b>Total</b>	<b>208,875</b>	<b>61,292</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>103,067</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>44,516</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>44,516</b>	<b>21</b>
Tripoli	Lebanese	200,469	100,235	50	80,188	40	20,047	10	0	0	0	0	2	20,047	10
	Syrian ref.	27,512	6,878	25	12,380	45	6,878	25	1,376	5	0	0	3	8,254	30
	Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria	10,907	1,091	10	3,817	35	4,363	40	1,636	15	0	0	3	5,999	55
	<b>Total</b>	<b>238,888</b>	<b>108,203</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>96,385</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>31,288</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>3,012</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>34,299</b>	<b>14</b>





District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Zahle	Lebanese	139,399	76,669	55	48,790	35	13,940	10	0	0	0	0	2	13,940	10
	Syrian ref.	129,834	19,475	15	58,425	45	45,442	35	6,492	5	0	0	3	51,934	40
	Total	269,233	96,145	36	107,215	40	59,382	22	6,492	2	0	0		65,874	24
Palestinian refugees	Palestinian refugees	231,515	57,879	25	92,606	40	69,455	30	11,576	5	0	0	3	81,030	35
	Total	231,515	57,879	25	92,606	40	69,455	30	11,576	5	0	0		81,030	35
Total	Lebanese	3,864,296	1,941,952	50	1,429,694	37	492,651	13	0	0	0	0		492,651	13
	Syrian ref.	1,000,000	204,958	20	460,739	46	297,178	30	37,125	4	0	0		334,303	34
	Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria	95,856	9,586	10	33,550	35	38,342	40	14,378	15	0	0		52,721	55
	Palestine ref.	231,515	57,879	25	92,606	40	69,455	30	11,576	5	0	0		81,030	35
	Grand Total	5,191,667	2,214,374	43	2,016,588	39	897,626	17	63,079	1	0	0		960,705	18

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, therefore, they may need continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.

## PROJECTION SITUATION OVERVIEW (APRIL - JULY 2026)

Acute food insecurity is expected to increase slightly during the projection period, with around 961,000 people (18 percent of the analysed population) projected to be in IPC Phase 3 or above, compared to 874,000 (17 percent) in the current period. This deterioration is driven primarily by anticipated reductions in humanitarian food security assistance, especially for Syrian refugees and post-2024 arrivals, combined with persistent economic fragility and localised recovery gaps.

Coverage for humanitarian food security assistance is forecasted to decline to 19 percent for Lebanese households, four percent for Syrian refugees, and zero for Palestine refugees, with no confirmed funding for Syrian refugee assistance beyond **May 2026**. These reductions are particularly staggering for Syrian refugees considering the 44-percentage point reduction compared to current, against a one-percentage point reduction for Lebanese residents. Reductions come at a time when many households currently in Phase 2 risk sliding into Phase 3, particularly in districts with high dependency on aid.

The projected increase also reflects seasonal pressures and the residual impact of conflict-related damage in southern Lebanon and Baalbek-El Hermel governorate, where recovery remains limited, and livelihoods are still heavily disrupted. Infrastructure damage, restricted access to services, and high costs for non-food essentials continue to constrain household resilience.

Although the ceasefire is expected to hold, localised insecurity and price unpredictability will likely offset gains from improved market functionality and agricultural activity. Without scaled-up support and accelerated recovery efforts, food security outcomes will remain fragile, with vulnerable populations, especially refugees and low-income households, facing heightened risk.

**Lebanese residents:** The number of Lebanese residents in Phase 3 is expected to rise from 484,000 in the current period (November 2025 to March 2026) to 493,000 in the projected period (April 2026 to July 2026), with the projected figure still representing 13 percent of the population. Like the current period and the previous analysis, no Lebanese residents are projected to be in Phase 4.

Six units of analysis are projected to be classified in Phase 3, up from four in the current period. These include the same units as the current period (Akkar, El Minieh-Dennie, Baalbek & El Hermel, and Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun) with the addition of the southern districts of El Nabatieh and Sour. The share of residents in Phase 3 or above is expected to remain at 25 percent in Akkar and Baalbek & El Hermel, assuming relative stability in these areas despite ongoing economic strain. El Nabatieh and Sour are projected to see their share of individuals in acute food insecurity rise from 15 percent in the current period to 20 percent in the projection period, driven by very limited reconstruction efforts, and the anticipated localised insecurity and sporadic incidents in southern districts—including Hasbaya, Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, Sour, and El Nabatieh—while the overall ceasefire is assumed to hold. These conditions are likely to continue disrupting livelihoods and market access, compounding vulnerability in areas already affected by displacement and strained services. Conversely, acute food insecurity is expected to decrease in the northern clusters of Bcharre & Zgharta (10 percent to 5 percent) and El Batroun & El Koura (5 percent to 0 percent), with both clusters remaining in Phase 2.

**Syrian refugees:** Syrian refugees are expected to witness the highest increase in the number of individuals in acute food insecurity, with 334,000 projected to be in Phase 3 or above, up from 277,000 in the current period, corresponding to an increase to 34 percent in Phase 3 or above, up from 28 percent in the current period. Particularly, the number of individuals classified in Phase 4 increased, with 37,100 Syrian refugees (4 percent of the population) expected to be facing Phase 4 levels of food insecurity, up from 1,300 (less than 1 percent) in the current period. The projected increase in Phase 4 among Syrian refugees is expected to affect the most vulnerable households that are currently fully reliant on humanitarian food assistance but will no longer receive support in the projection period, as assistance coverage for Syrian refugees is anticipated to decline sharply—from 48 percent in the current period to just 4 percent between April and July 2026, with no confirmed funding starting from May 2026. As a result of this projection, Syrian refugees are expected to report the highest occurrence of Phase 4 among all population groups between April and July 2026. Additionally, some 297,000 Syrian refugees (30 percent of the population) are projected to be in Phase 3, up from 276,000 (28 percent) in the current period.

A total of 24 units of analysis are expected to be classified in Phase 3, with the district of Bcharre expected to remain the only unit nationwide in Phase 2 during the projection period. The most widespread acute food insecurity is expected in the districts of Baalbek and El Hermel (45 percent each), followed by the districts of Akkar, West Bekaa, and Zahle (40 percent each).

The highest increase of proportion of the population in Phase 3 or above between the current and projection period is expected in Akkar (30 to 40 percent) and El Hermel (35 to 45 percent). All other units, except for the district of Bcharre, are projected to see a deterioration of five percentage points from the current period.

The highest occurrence of people in Phase 4 is expected in Akkar (14,300), Zahle (6,500), Baalbek (5,600), West Bekaa (2,600), El Minieh-Dennie (2,200), and Saida (2,200). This marks a significant deterioration for these individuals, as none of these units of analysis reported any occurrence of Phase 4 in the current period.

**Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria:** The prevalence of acute food insecurity among the post-2024 arrivals population is expected to worsen in all three units of analysis, namely the districts of Akkar and Tripoli and the Baalbek & El Hermel cluster. In all three units, individuals in Phase 3 or above are expected to reach 55 percent of the population, up from 45 percent in the current period. The total number of post-2024 arrivals facing high levels of food insecurity will likely reach 53,000 in the projection period, 14,000 of which will likely be in Phase 4, marking a significant increase from 43,000 in Phase 3 or above in the current period, of which 10,000 were in Phase 4. The highest prevalence of food insecurity is expected to remain in Baalbek & El Hermel, with 27,000 people in Phase 3, up from 24,000 in the current period, and 10,000 people in Phase 4, up from 7,000 in the current period. This deterioration is expected to primarily affect households currently reliant on humanitarian food assistance, as coverage for this group is projected to fall from 25 percent in the current period to zero percent by April to July 2026. The complete withdrawal of assistance, combined with limited income opportunities and restricted mobility, is likely to push the most vulnerable post-2024 arrivals households into Emergency levels of food insecurity.

**Palestine refugees:** Some 81,000 Palestine refugees, representing 35 percent of the population, are likely to be in Phase 3 or above in the projection period. This is up from 69,000 people (30 percent) in the current period. The number of people in Phase 3 is expected to increase from 58,000 (25 percent) to 69,000 (30 percent) while the number of people in Phase 4 is projected to remain unchanged at 12,000 (5 percent).

## Key Assumptions

**Conflict:** The November 2024 cessation of hostilities remains in place, but intermittent air-strikes and cross-border incidents are expected to persist at low intensity, maintaining a fragile ceasefire. In Baalbek-El Hermel governorate, sporadic security incidents may occur, though overall risk remains limited. Along the Syrian border, the March 2025 de-escalation agreement is holding, with occasional smuggling-related tensions likely to continue. Full-scale conflict is not projected during the outlook period.

**Displacement:** Around 64,000 people remain displaced from southern areas, with slow returns expected to persist due to insecurity and damaged infrastructure. The current displacement situation is likely to endure throughout the projection period, as continued instability and limited reconstruction hinder safe and voluntary returns. Prolonged displacement continues to erode livelihoods and coping capacity.

**Economic growth:** Lebanon's economy is expected to remain in a fragile recovery phase through late 2025, with GDP projected to grow by around 4–5 percent following a sharp 2024 contraction. Gradual stabilisation, reforms, and tourism recovery support modest improvement, though structural weaknesses and low credit access persist. Income conditions may improve unevenly, driven by wage dollarisation and limited reconstruction inflows, but vulnerability remains high amid constrained remittances and slow sectoral recovery.

**Currency depreciation:** The Lebanese pound is expected to remain stable through early 2026, sustained by tight monetary policy, fiscal restraint, and ongoing Central Bank interventions. Foreign reserves have strengthened amid steady remittance inflows and controlled liquidity. Continued stability, however, remains conditional on fiscal discipline and the absence of renewed conflict or policy shocks.

**Inflation:** Inflation is expected to remain subdued during the projection period, supported by exchange rate stability, easing import costs, and steady food supply. The Full SMEB rose only 2 percent between March and August 2025, reflecting a marked slowdown from late 2024. While service costs may continue rising gradually with tariff adjustments, food and non-food prices are projected to fluctuate within +/-2 percent monthly, barring external shocks.

**Humanitarian food security assistance:** Humanitarian food security assistance is expected to decline sharply across all groups due to funding shortfalls, especially among Syrian refugees. Coverage for Lebanese households will fall to 19 percent, while Syrian refugee assistance will drop to 4 percent, with no confirmed funding beyond April 2026. Palestine refugees and post-2024 arrivals are projected to receive no assistance, leaving these groups highly exposed.

**Political developments:** Political stability is expected to hold through the projection period, with preparations for 2026 elections and limited progress on reforms. Some incremental policy measures may advance, but no major agreement on financial restructuring or IMF program is anticipated.

**Tensions:** Social and community tensions are expected to remain elevated, driven by continued refugee arrivals, resource pressures, and localised insecurity linked to non-state actors and smuggling networks. Disarmament efforts and weak state capacity may trigger localized flashpoints, particularly in border and peripheral areas.

**Market functionality:** Markets are expected to remain fully functional over the coming months, with strong availability, supply chain resilience, and stable access. Price unpredictability may persist for select commodities, but overall market capacity is projected to remain near full functionality across all governorates.

**Agriculture and domestic food supply:** Agricultural recovery will remain slow amid drought, damaged infrastructure, and high input costs, with below-average production expected in 2025/26. Food imports will stay stable and critical to national supply, but foreign-currency constraints and renewed conflict could disrupt trade and pressure prices.

### Protracted insecurity in border areas under ongoing low-intensity conflict and cross-border risks

The November 2024 cessation of hostilities in southern Lebanon remains formally in place; however, sporadic airstrikes and shelling continue to be reported, especially along the border areas. This fragile ceasefire is expected to endure, with protracted low intensity conflict, characterized by intermittent strikes and restricted access in certain localities, especially the South. In Baalbek-El Hermel governorate, the risk of spillover is lower but remains present. In the north-eastern border areas, cross-border clashes are not projected, however localized incidents, particularly smuggling-related tensions, are expected to persist intermittently given the fluid dynamics inside Syria. Overall, while full-scale conflict is not projected during the outlook period, localized insecurity and cross-border incidents are expected to continue at low intensity, maintaining a fragile and unpredictable security environment.

### Ongoing internal displacement and post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria

As of October 2025, an estimated 64,400 individuals remain internally displaced, primarily from areas along the southern border, including parts of Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, and El Nabatieh. This level of displacement is expected to persist throughout the projection period. Returns will continue at a slow pace due to insecurity, contamination, and housing damage. In parallel, the post-2024 arrivals are projected to sustain pressure on host communities, with the caseload likely exceeding 120,000 people, concentrated in the districts of Akkar, Tripoli, Baalbek and El Hermel. These dynamics will maintain high demand for assistance and strain on services.

### Slow post-conflict recovery under fragile and uneven conditions

Lebanon's economy is expected to remain in a fragile but gradually improving recovery phase through late 2025 and early 2026. In 2025, real GDP is projected to grow by about 4.7 percent, supported by the recovery of tourism and private consumption, limited reconstruction inflows, and a low statistical base from the previous year. Nonetheless, the economy remains highly vulnerable to shocks. Key productive sectors—agriculture, commerce, and tourism, which together accounted for nearly 80 percent of conflict-related losses—are recovering slowly, especially in the South and Bekaa, where damage to infrastructure and insecurity continue to limit investment.

Lebanese households continue to rely on a diversified mix of income sources, including remittances, wage employment, informal labour, and humanitarian aid. Widespread dollarisation of wages, with nearly three-quarters of private-sector salaries now paid in USD, has helped stabilize purchasing power for middle-income earners and anchored price expectations. However, informal employment remains extensive, particularly among youth and low-income groups, and female labour participation remains among the lowest in the region. Looking forward, income conditions are expected to improve moderately but unevenly, supported by a gradual recovery in labour demand and the continuation of public wage payments in USD.

The outlook remains cautiously optimistic, contingent on sustained political stability, continued ceasefire adherence, and implementation of reform. Short of a deal with the IMF and engagement from international and Gulf donor countries, external funding for post-war reconstruction and macroeconomic stability is expected to remain insufficient and slow-moving relative to need.

### Stable currency and softening inflation underpin fragile price stability

The Lebanese pound has remained broadly stable at around LBP89,700/USD on the informal market since October 2023 and LBP89,500/USD for government and financial accounting since February 2024, marking two years of exchange rate stability that has helped anchor inflation, which has decreased from 45 percent in 2024 to a projected 15 percent in 2025. In the near term, both exchange rate and inflation stability are expected to persist through early 2026, conditional on continued fiscal discipline, monetary control, and the absence of renewed conflict. Food and non-food SMEB components are projected to fluctuate within +/-2 percent monthly, while service costs will likely rise gradually as public-service tariffs and fees adjust.

### Markets stable and well-supplied amid lingering price fluctuations

By mid-2025, WFP's Market Functionality Index (MFI) indicated that markets across Lebanon had largely regained full operability, with most governorates reporting normal levels of availability, stock coverage, and supply chain resilience. During the projection period, market functionality is expected to remain strong, with full capacity maintained across most areas. However, some lingering price unpredictability—particularly for perishable and imported goods—may continue to slightly affect market efficiency in conflict-prone or remote locations.

### Weak harvest and drought conditions undermine domestic food supply despite steady imports

During the projection period, agricultural recovery is expected to remain limited, particularly in conflict-affected southern districts such as Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, and Sour, where access to cropland, irrigation networks, and agricultural inputs remains constrained. The combined effects of drought, depleted soil moisture, and high input costs will continue to hinder production, with below-average planting and yields anticipated across both rain-fed and irrigated systems. In the Bekaa and Baalbek-El Hermel governorates, ongoing rainfall deficits and irrigation cutbacks are likely to further stress crops and livestock, resulting in continued production losses and upward pressure on prices for water-intensive produce and dairy products.

The 2025/26 cereal harvest is expected to remain well below average, reinforcing Lebanon's reliance on food imports to meet domestic consumption. Wheat import requirements are projected to increase by around eight percent above average, sustaining the country's dependence on external supply amid one of its worst droughts on record. Food imports are expected to remain stable overall, supported by resilient trade channels and sufficient market demand, though foreign-currency availability and shipping costs will continue to determine import volumes and timing. Current storage capacity at mill level—covering roughly two months of national needs—will help buffer short-term fluctuations, though the absence of a strategic grain reserve leaves the system exposed to potential shocks.

Looking ahead, agriculture is unlikely to recover in the short term, with reconstruction of damaged irrigation infrastructure progressing slowly and farmers facing persistent liquidity shortages. While supply chains are expected to remain functional, the outlook for domestic production remains highly vulnerable to renewed conflict, further drought, and continued financial strain, keeping Lebanon dependent on imports to maintain national food availability.

### Limited reform progress despite restored political stability

Building on the institutional momentum observed in the current period, political stability is likely to persist through the projection period, with preparations for the 2026 parliamentary elections expected to be finalised and some incremental reforms likely to advance. However, broad political consensus on key financial legislation, particularly regarding the distribution of post-2019 financial losses, remains improbable. As a result, prospects for meaningful reform and an IMF-supported program remain uncertain, with the overall political trajectory expected to deliver limited but continued institutional consolidation rather than transformative change.

### Fragile social cohesion under pressure from continued displacement and localised insecurity

In the context of persistent tensions observed through 2025, inter- and intra-communal tensions are expected to remain elevated throughout the projection period. Host-community fatigue, continued refugee arrivals, and slow progress on organized return mechanisms will likely sustain public resentment and restrictive local measures. Meanwhile, the combination of economic hardship, weak governance, and the persistence of non-state armed groups will continue to fuel insecurity at the community level.

### Anticipated reductions in humanitarian food security assistance to increase pressure on most vulnerable groups

Humanitarian food security assistance is expected to decline sharply across all population groups due to severe funding constraints, especially among Syrian refugees and Palestinian refugees. For Lebanese households, coverage is projected to slightly fall to around 19 percent, equivalent to approximately 735,000 individuals, compared to 20 percent in the current period. For Syrian refugees, assistance will drop to just four percent, reflecting only the caseload for which funding has been confirmed for April 2026. At the time of analysis, no funding is secured for Syrian refugee assistance beyond April 2026, raising serious concerns about continuity of support.

For Palestine refugees, assistance is expected to reach zero percent during the projection period, down from 10 percent in the current period, leaving this group highly exposed. Similarly, post-2024 arrivals will receive no assistance, compared to limited coverage earlier in 2025.

These anticipated reductions come at a critical juncture: while humanitarian assistance has already fallen from the surge in late 2024, it remains a lifeline for hundreds of thousands of vulnerable households. The sharp contraction in coverage risks reversing recent gains achieved through sustained humanitarian efforts and improved market conditions. Many households currently in Phase 2 could deteriorate into Crisis without predictable funding and contingency planning. Ensuring multi-month commitments and prioritising high-severity areas will be essential to prevent a resurgence of acute food insecurity.



## IPC trends

Lebanon's successive IPC analyses since late 2022 trace a long period of elevated but gradually improving food insecurity. From a peak during the early years of the crisis (September 2022), when widespread loss of purchasing power and shrinking assistance left more than one in four residents in Crisis or Emergency, conditions have progressively eased through 2025 and 2026 as markets stabilised, inflation slowed, and local supply chains recovered. Although the crisis remains severe for many, the latest analysis shows that, for the first time since IPC analysis was implemented in Lebanon, fewer than one million people are currently facing Phase 3 or above.

Following modest recovery through 2023, the escalation of conflict in late 2024 temporarily reversed progress, pushing around 1.59 million people (29 percent) into Phase 3 or above, including 200,000 people (4 percent) in Phase 4, the highest level recorded in two years. By early 2025, as hostilities subsided and market access improved, acute food insecurity fell sharply: the April–June 2025 period registered 1.17 million people (21 percent) in Phase 3 or 4, supported by seasonal labour income, remittances, tourism, and partial restoration of livelihoods.

During the following projection (July–October 2025), food insecurity was expected to slightly worsen at 1.24 million people (23 percent) in the context of continued funding constraints. The current analysis for November 2025 to March 2026 indicates a clear reduction in food insecurity levels, with approximately 872,000 people (17 percent) in Phase 3 or above and only 22,000 (0.4 percent) in Phase 4. The share of the population classified as food secure (IPC Phase 1, None/Minimal) has risen to 43 percent, the highest since 2022, while the proportion in Phase 2 conditions remains stable at around 41 percent.

Looking ahead, the projection for April–July 2026 points to a slight seasonal increase, with 960,000 people (18 percent) expected to be in Phase 3 or above, including 63,000 (1 percent) in Phase 4. This mild deterioration is linked mainly to anticipated funding and operational constraints leading to reduced humanitarian assistance coverage, alongside seasonal price increases and persistent livelihood stress.

Overall, trends since mid-2024 point to a gradual but fragile recovery from the peak of conflict-related disruption. However, food insecurity levels remain elevated, and improvements are highly dependent on sustained humanitarian assistance, stable security conditions, and the continued recovery of local markets and incomes. In the absence of structural reforms and stronger social protection, vulnerability among displaced and low-income households is likely to persist.




Figure 1: IPC phase classification trends (2023-2026)

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

### Response priorities

**Lifesaving and Humanitarian Food Security Assistance:** Given the projected sharp reductions, it is critical to ensure transfer values remain aligned with updated SMEB/MEB costs. It is essential as well to continue contingency planning for localised access disruptions and maintain multi-sectoral operations in hard-to-reach and high-vulnerability areas and to the most vulnerable population groups, which will help mitigate risks, particularly for Syrian refugees and post-2024 arrivals, where no funding is confirmed beyond April 2026. At the same time, advocating for multi-year, flexible funding commitments from donors and international partners is essential to sustain humanitarian operations and prevent pipeline breaks. Exploring innovative financing mechanisms, including blended humanitarian-development approaches, can help bridge gaps and support long-term recovery.

**Social safety net systems:** Strengthening and expanding national and humanitarian social assistance programs is necessary to address poverty and vulnerability. This includes supporting the continuation of the World Bank-funded Emergency Social Safety Net Project (ESSN), also known as AMAN, seeking additional funding for shock-responsive mechanisms, and improving targeting systems and data integration between national and humanitarian schemes. Linking assistance with protection and legal aid for individuals lacking documentation will ensure equitable coverage.

**Targeted support for post-2024 arrivals:** Given the projected deterioration in food security among the post-2024 arrivals—where prevalence of Phase 3 or above is expected to reach 55 percent and humanitarian food assistance coverage will drop from 25 percent to zero by April 2026—it is critical to prioritise emergency support for this population group. This includes maintaining contingency pipelines for rapid response in high-severity districts such as Akkar, Tripoli, and Baalbek, and El Hermel, and deploying short-term assistance mechanisms such as vouchers or in-kind distributions to prevent households from falling into Phase 4. Integrating protection and mobility support, particularly in areas where movement is restricted, and advocating for earmarked donor funding will be essential to mitigate risks and address acute vulnerability among this group.

**Livelihood assistance:** Scaling up cash-for-work and short-term employment schemes focused on recovery efforts, infrastructure rehabilitation, and public service support in return areas should be prioritised. Providing grants and input support to conflict-affected Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), particularly in agriculture, retail, and services, and promoting inclusive job opportunities for women and youth through vocational training and microenterprise support will strengthen resilience.

**Agricultural rehabilitation and strengthening agri-food systems:** Restoring agricultural livelihoods, supporting the recovery and reconstruction of the agrifood sector, and enhancing food security in areas most affected by the recent conflict, drought, and compounded crises are key priorities. These will be achieved through targeted emergency assistance to small-scale crop and livestock producers to protect and restore farmlands as productive assets, enable the timely resumption of disrupted farming cycles, and alleviate critical constraints in access to capital; alongside the rehabilitation of agricultural assets and infrastructure, support to the recovery and development of agrifood systems, and the strengthening of information systems for evidence-based IPC analysis and decision-making

**Support to recovery of food systems:** Rehabilitating food systems is critical to ensuring sustainable access to food in conflict-affected areas. Recommended interventions include: supporting the recovery of food processing facilities, storage units, marketplaces, and bakeries through the provision of equipment, raw materials, and micro-grants or loans. Rebuilding feeder roads and transport infrastructure to facilitate the movement of goods and reintegrate rural production zones into national supply chains. Strengthening local food value chains through inclusive procurement practices, such as linking school feeding or institutional buyers to smallholder cooperatives.

**Education and school feeding programs:** Scaling up school feeding programs targeting displaced and host community children in priority districts, linking school feeding to local food production, and integrating nutrition and psychosocial services into education responses will help mitigate negative coping strategies such as child labor and school dropout.

**Integrate nutrition sensitive activities:** Embedding nutrition-sensitive interventions across food security and recovery efforts is necessary to improve dietary diversity and nutritional outcomes. This includes promoting community education, ensuring access to fortified foods, and strengthening collaboration between agriculture, health, and social protection systems.

### Situation Monitoring and Update

It is essential to continue monitoring food security trends, displacement dynamics, and market conditions, particularly in high-severity districts located in the south, El Nabatieh, Baalbek-El Hermel, and Akkar governorates. In addition, monitoring cross-border movements and internal displacement is critical, as any escalation in conflict could trigger new displacement waves, while

significant cross-border movements—either into or out of Lebanon—would directly affect the population in need. By enhancing real-time price tracking and humanitarian assistance coverage monitoring, and by improving coordination among humanitarian, development, and government actors, the response can remain timely and adaptive to emerging risks.

### Risk factors to monitor

- **Conflict and security situation:** The nationwide ceasefire implemented on 27 November 2024 continues to hold, contributing to improved security conditions. However, it is important to note that the situation remains volatile, with sporadic incidents and localized insecurity, particularly along border areas in the south and east. The risk of renewed hostilities persists, making contingency planning and scenario-based preparedness essential to safeguard humanitarian access, ensure continuity of services, and protect affected populations.
- **Political developments:** While the election of a new president in January 2025 and the formation of a government brought renewed optimism, progress on structural reforms remains slow. Monitoring preparations for the parliamentary elections planned for May 2026 is critical, as these developments will shape governance, fiscal policy, and the enabling environment for social protection and humanitarian interventions.
- **IDPs and displacement dynamics:** Around 64,000 individuals are expected to remain internally displaced during the projection period, while post-2024 arrivals will continue to exert pressure on host communities and services. These dynamics increase vulnerability and could trigger secondary displacement if humanitarian assistance and recovery support remain insufficient.
- **Increased inter-community tensions and refugee dynamics:** Tensions between host communities and refugee populations are likely to persist, particularly in areas with high concentrations of post-2024 arrivals and Palestine refugees. Competition over jobs, housing, and assistance could escalate localised disputes, especially in northern districts and urban centers where resources are already strained.
- **Humanitarian and social assistance:** Reductions in humanitarian assistance, including shortfalls in transfer values for food and non-food needs and limited funding for critical programs and vulnerable population groups remain a key concern. As such, close monitoring of assistance coverage, beneficiary needs, and the operational environment is essential to support timely advocacy, resource mobilisation, and program adaptation.
- **Prices, exchange rate, and market dynamics:** While the informal exchange rate has remained broadly stable, prices for food staples and essential non-food goods continue to be elevated. The risk of further shocks, whether internal or regional, could lead to renewed volatility in market prices and further limit household access to basic commodities. Regular tracking of market trends, price fluctuations, any potential exchange rate fluctuation, and household purchasing power remains vital to guide program adjustments and safeguard food security outcomes. In addition, the continued adjustments of essential non-food services prices, due to the ongoing dollarization in the country, as well as any potential new tariffs that might be introduced, and rising operation costs, may further increase the strain on households' purchasing power and expenditures in the coming year.
- **Nutrition:** Malnutrition monitoring is also necessary, especially with the marked disparities across geographical areas and population groups. As such, continuous monitoring is essential for early and timely identification of relevant interventions.
- **Service delivery and funding:** Persistent gaps in service delivery, including health, WASH, and education, pose a significant risk to recovery. These gaps are compounded by critical funding shortfalls and the suspension of key donor support since early 2025. Without predictable, multi-year financing, service provision could deteriorate further, undermining household resilience and increasing vulnerability to food insecurity.

## PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

The IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis was conducted for two periods: 1) Current: November 2025 – March 2026; 2) Projected: April 2026 – July 2026. The analysis covered all 26 districts of the country. Lebanese residents were analysed separately at the district level for 12 districts, while seven clusters were created as follows: Baalbek and El Hermel, Bent Jbeil and Marjaayoun, Bcharre and Zgharta, Chouf and Jezzine, El Batroun and El Koura, Jbeil and Kesrwan, Rachaya and Hasbaya. Syrian refugees have been analysed separately at the district level for 24 districts, while one unit of analysis was created by clustering Bent Jbeil and Marjaayoun districts. Palestine refugees were analysed as one unit of analysis at the national level including Palestine Refugees in Lebanon (PRL) residing in camps, PRL residing outside camps and in gatherings, and Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS). Post-2024 arrivals were analysed in three units of analysis, of which two districts (Akkar and Tripoli) and one cluster (Baalbek and El Hermel).

The analysis was held in person in Beirut, Lebanon, with the support of the IPC Global Support Unit (IPC GSU). The workshop was conducted between 23 and 31 October 2025 and was attended by 65 experts including Technical Working Group (TWG) members and analysts from UN organizations, local and international NGOs, technical agencies, and governmental institutions. Members have local expertise which better supported in understanding the overall context to ensure a contextualized and accurate reflection of food insecurity needs in Lebanon. The analysis was completed using the Analysis Platform (AP) and the data used in the analysis was organized according to the IPC analytical framework and entails food insecurity contributing factors, outcome indicators, and multiple secondary sources.

The evidence level of the analysis is assessed as Medium (\*\*) as per the IPC protocols.

The main sources of data used for the analysis of outcome indicators included:

1. Mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (mVAM) conducted by WFP with data from April 2025 until September 2025 for the Lebanese residents.
2. The Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) conducted jointly by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNHCR and WFP including data from May and June 2025.
3. Palestine refugees High Frequency Monitoring Survey conducted by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) including data from August 2025.
4. An Emergency Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment (EFSVA) designed to capture immediate food security needs among post-2024 arrival families and host communities in the governorates of Akkar, North, and Baalbek-El Hermel, spanning July 2025 (for Akkar and north) and September 2025 (for Baalbek-El Hermel).

Other data sources on the food security contributing factors included: UNHCR protection monitoring for the first and second quarter of 2025; Overview of communal relations in Lebanon (Tension monitoring) conducted by UNDP; Monthly Market monitors by WFP; Market Functionality Index Assessment by WFP; Displacement Tracking Matrix by IOM; ACLED dataset on conflict and political violence; FAO 2024 Damage and Losses Assessment; FAO GIEWS Update; and OXFAM Qualitative Gender Study (2025).

Humanitarian Food Security Assistance (HFSA) data was provided by the Food Security and Agriculture cluster with the support of all reporting partners. HFSA that can be considered for an IPC analysis includes direct resource transfers that aim to reduce food gaps, protect, and save lives and livelihoods. Only transfers that are intended to have an immediate positive effect on access to food were considered in the analysis. Assessing the levels and the broader mitigating effect of HFSA is a key component of an IPC analysis, as IPC is a snapshot analysis and integrates all aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to the current and projected situation. However, IPC protocols are not designed (nor should they be used) to assess or evaluate the impact of any humanitarian food assistance on food insecurity, or to monitor achievements towards program level goals.

## Limitations of the Analysis

The IPC analysis for this round faced several limitations including:

**Evolving population figures and displacement dynamics:** The fluidity of population movements, both within Lebanon and across its borders, complicated the analysis. Discrepancies in population estimates, coupled with the absence of updated official figures, necessitated reliance on the population numbers endorsed by the LRP and inter-agency coordination systems. This decision, while pragmatic, underscores the inherent uncertainty in displacement and population data during such volatile periods.

**Data gaps in specific districts:** Some units of analysis for both Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees did not meet the minimum requirements due to limited sample size. Alternative IPC protocols, such as the clustering approach, was adopted across the districts where the sample size was insufficient, were applied to ensure a representative and reliable assessment. However, such adjustments may have influenced the granularity of findings for some regions, especially for the clustered areas.

**HSFA funding volatility and programmatic uncertainty:** The planning and assumptions underpinning the provision of HSFA were challenged by a lack of visibility on funding flows and implementation plans across key population groups. Recurrent adjustments from donor side, combined with shifting programmatic priorities and projected reductions in coverage, created difficulty in establishing consistent assumptions. These changes required repeated coordination with operational agencies to validate and confirm funding, and associated assumptions.

Despite these limitations, the IPC TWG employed rigorous protocols and methodologies to ensure the analysis reliability and relevance. Continuous monitoring and future IPC analyses will be critical in addressing these gaps and refining the understanding of food security dynamics in Lebanon.

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## Contact for further Information

### El Hajjar, Rima

Head of Economic & Marketing Service- Ministry of Agriculture

Email: [marima06@hotmail.com](mailto:marima06@hotmail.com)

### Principi, Marco

Head of Research, Assessment and Monitoring Unit- WFP Lebanon

Email: [marco.principi@wfp.org](mailto:marco.principi@wfp.org)

### Alwahsh, Mohie

Food Security Sector Coordinator in Lebanon

Email: [mohie.alwahsh@wfp.org](mailto:mohie.alwahsh@wfp.org)

### Careme, Etienne

Liaison and Resilience Officer, FAO Lebanon

Email: [etienne.careme@fao.org](mailto:etienne.careme@fao.org)

### Souhani, Abdallah

Head of Research – WFP Lebanon - IPC TWG Coordinator

Email: [abdallah.souhani@wfp.org](mailto:abdallah.souhani@wfp.org)

### IPC Global Support Unit

[www.ipcinfo.org](http://www.ipcinfo.org)

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Classification of food insecurity and malnutrition was conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Against Hunger, CARE, CILSS, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), EC-JRC, FAO, FEWS NET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IFPRI, IGAD, IMPACT Initiatives, Oxfam, SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and the World Bank.

## What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity?

The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of acute food and nutrition crises as well as chronic food insecurity based on international standards. The IPC consists of four mutually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consensus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and comparability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and programming.

For the IPC, Acute Food Insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity.

## IPC Analysis Partners:

