LEBANON

CONTINUED CONFLICT AND FURTHER CUTS TO HUMANITARIAN FOOD ASSISTANCE DRIVE ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PROJECTION UPDATE ANALYSIS

APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2024

Published on 30 May 2024

Overview

According to the latest projection update, around 1.26 million people (23 percent of the analysed population) are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between April and September 2024. This includes 85,000 people (2 percent of the analysed population) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 1.18 million people (21 percent of the analysed population) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis).

The analysed population includes Lebanese, Syrian refugees, Palestine Refugees in Lebanon (PRL) and Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS). Among the 1.26 million people expected to be in IPC Phase 3 or above between April and September 2024, 683,000 are Lebanese residents (18 percent of the resident population), 510,000 are Syrian refugees (34 percent of the Syrians refugees in Lebanon), 55,000 are PRL (31 percent of the PRL population in Lebanon), and 13,600 are PRS (45 percent of the PRS population in Lebanon). Populations classified in IPC Phase 3 or above require urgent humanitarian action to reduce food gaps, protect and restore livelihoods and prevent acute malnutrition.

PROJECTION UPDATE: APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2024

(Lebanese Residents, Syrian Refugees, Palestine Refugees in Lebanon, and Palestine Refugees from Syria)

1.26M

23% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	85,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	1,176,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	2,464,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	1,850,000 People in Food Security

Key Drivers

Inflation

Inflation is expected to persist and remain within the last six months level (27 percent increase between August 2023 and February 2024). Food Inflation is estimated to be impacted by the likely phase out of the bread subsidy, which is estimated to result in an increase of the food SMEB price by up to 10 percent.

Anticipated reductions in humanitarian food assistance (HFA)

The level of HFA is expected to further decline during the projection period, beyond what was first anticipated, with cuts to assistance affecting all population groups. Assistance to Lebanese is anticipated to be much lower than expected while assistance to Syrian and Palestine refugees has been impacted by further cuts.

Conflict

Continued clashes at the southern border are affecting livelihoods and leading to internal displacement, contributing to the vulnerabilities of households. Displacement is expected to continue, potentially reaching 140,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) by September 2024, up from 91,000 IDPs in April 2024. An increase in inter-communal tensions are also anticipated in the coming months as negative perceptions of communal relations between residents and the refugee population grow.

Projection update: April - September 2024



ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PROJECTION UPDATE (APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2024)

LEBANESE RESIDENTS - UPDATED PROJECTION: April - September 2024

683,000
18% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	41,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	642,400 People in Crisis
Phase 2	1,639,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	1,543,000 People in Food Security

SYRIAN REFUGEES - UPDATED PROJECTION: April - September 2024

510,000
34% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	39,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	471,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	730,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	260,000 People in Food Security

PALESTINE REFUGEES IN LEBANON - UPDATED PROJECTION: April - September 2024

55,000
31% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	4,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	51,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	81,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	44,000 People in Food Security

PALESTINE REFUGEES FROM SYRIA - UPDATED PROJECTION: April - September 2024

13,600
45% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	1,500 People in Emergency
Phase 3	12,100 People in Crisis
Phase 2	13,600 People in Stressed
Phase 1	3,000 People in Food Security

Justification of the IPC Projection Update

The third IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis was conducted in Lebanon in October 2023, covering two time periods: 1) Current period: October 2023 – March 2024, and 2) Projected period: April – September 2024. Various contextual developments resulted in the need to call for a new projection update for the period of April to September 2024.

On 7 October 2023, while the third IPC analysis workshop was ongoing, war broke out in the Occupied Palestinian Territory of Gaza, with the conflict spreading and persisting since then in the southern border region of Lebanon. Given this drastic situational change, it was too early back then to predict what the repercussions would be on the food security landscape of the country. Moreover, the funding shortfall in Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) was previously assumed to impact mainly the refugee population.

However, with the escalation of clashes at the southern border, resulting in around 91,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) as of April 2024, the new reductions in assistance to Lebanese that were not previously accounted for, and the further expected reductions in assistance to refugees, a projection update of the food security classification was deemed necessary. Several changes to the assumptions used for the previous projection include the shift in the economic situation due to the ongoing conflict, decreasing arrivals to Lebanon affecting the different tourism seasons, persistent inflation that is higher than expected, and delays in the extension of the AMAN program. These factors collectively highlight the need for this updated projection analysis, in order to address the evolving food security challenges in Lebanon.

SECURITY SITUATION

The updated projection analysis assumed that the conflict along Lebanon's southern border ongoing since 8 October 2023, would not spiral into a full-scale conflict. It was assumed that armed clashes would continue with similar intensity and remain mostly localized in the south and Nabatieh Governorates. It has also been assumed that the conflict's primary impact area would remain within the 7 km border radius. However, less frequent attacks targeting areas of Mount Lebanon, Baalbek-El Hermel, and Bekaa Governorates were also expected. Displacement was also expected to continue increasing, potentially reaching 140,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) by September 2024 from 91,000 IDPs in April 2024 (AWG 2024).

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PROJECTION UPDATE MAP (APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2024)



Key for the Map

IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

(mapped Phase represents highest severity affecting at least 20% of the population)

- 1 - Minimal
- 2 - Stressed
- 3 - Crisis
- 4 - Emergency
- 5 - Famine
- Areas with inadequate evidence
- Areas not analysed

Map Symbols

- Syrian Refugees
- Palestine Refugees

Area receives significant humanitarian food assistance
(accounted for in Phase classification)

- > 25% of households meet 25-50% of caloric needs through assistance
- > 25% of households meet > 50% of caloric needs through assistance

Evidence Level

** Medium

POPULATION TABLE FOR THE PROJECTION UPDATE (APRIL – SEPTEMBER 2024)

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#peop	%		#people	%
Akkar	Lebanese	297,886	59,577	20	134,049	45	89,366	30	14,894	5	0	0	3	104,260	35
	Syrian Ref.	156,645	15,665	10	78,323	50	54,826	35	7,832	5	0	0	3	62,658	40
	Total	454,531	75,242	17	212,371	47	144,192	32	22,727	5	0	0		166,919	37
Aley	Lebanese	210,677	84,271	40	105,339	50	21,068	10	0	0	0	0	2	21,068	10
	Syrian Ref.	87,946	26,384	30	43,973	50	17,589	20	0	0	0	0	3	17,589	20
	Total	298,623	110,655	37	149,312	50	38,657	13	0	0	0	0		38,657	13
Baabda	Lebanese	410,718	164,287	40	164,287	40	82,144	20	0	0	0	0	3	82,144	20
	Palestine Ref.	13,832	3,458	25	6,224	45	3,458	25	692	5	0	0	3	4,150	30
	Syrian Ref.	145,924	29,185	20	65,666	45	51,073	35	0	0	0	0	3	51,073	35
	Total	570,474	196,930	35	236,177	41	136,675	24	692	0	0	0		137,367	24
Baalbek	Lebanese	192,906	48,227	25	86,808	45	48,227	25	9,645	5	0	0	3	57,872	30
	Palestine Ref.	1,538	385	25	692	45	385	25	77	5	0	0	3	462	30
	Syrian Ref.	186,973	18,697	10	93,487	50	65,441	35	9,349	5	0	0	3	74,790	40
	Total	381,417	67,308	18	180,986	47	114,052	30	19,071	5	0	0		133,123	35
Bcharre	Lebanese	20,830	10,415	50	9,374	45	1,042	5	0	0	0	0	2	1,042	5
	Syrian Ref.	2,080	416	20	1,352	65	312	15	0	0	0	0	2	312	15
	Total	22,910	10,831	47	10,726	47	1,354	6	0	0	0	0		1,354	6
Beirut	Lebanese	236,109	118,055	50	82,638	35	35,416	15	0	0	0	0	2	35,416	15
	Syrian Ref.	34,981	10,494	30	15,741	45	8,745	25	0	0	0	0	3	8,745	25
	Total	271,090	128,549	47	98,380	36	44,162	16	0	0	0	0		44,162	16
Bent Jbeil	Lebanese	84,781	25,434	30	42,391	50	16,956	20	0	0	0	0	3	16,956	20
	Syrian Ref.	13,070	3,921	30	6,535	50	2,614	20	0	0	0	0	3	2,614	20
	Total	97,851	29,355	30	48,926	50	19,570	20	0	0	0	0		19,570	20
Chouf	Lebanese	207,481	93,366	45	93,366	45	20,748	10	0	0	0	0	2	20,748	10
	Syrian Ref.	68,270	17,068	25	37,549	55	13,654	20	0	0	0	0	3	13,654	20
	Total	275,751	110,434	40	130,915	47	34,402	12	0	0	0	0		34,402	12
El Batroun	Lebanese	53,354	29,345	55	21,342	40	2,668	5	0	0	0	0	2	2,668	5
	Syrian Ref.	18,258	4,565	25	10,955	60	2,739	15	0	0	0	0	2	2,739	15
	Total	71,612	33,909	47	32,296	45	5,406	8	0	0	0	0		5,406	8
El Hermel	Lebanese	28,732	7,183	25	12,929	45	8,620	30	0	0	0	0	3	8,620	30
	Syrian Ref.	13,151	1,315	10	7,233	55	4,603	35	0	0	0	0	3	4,603	35
	Total	41,883	8,498	20	20,162	48	13,222	32	0	0	0	0		13,222	32
El Koura	Lebanese	72,432	36,216	50	32,594	45	3,622	5	0	0	0	0	2	3,622	5
	Syrian Ref.	22,227	4,445	20	11,114	50	6,668	30	0	0	0	0	3	6,668	30
	Total	94,659	40,661	43	43,708	46	10,290	11	0	0	0	0		10,290	11
El Meten	Lebanese	395,931	217,762	55	138,576	35	39,593	10	0	0	0	0	2	39,593	10
	Syrian Ref.	51,865	15,560	30	20,746	40	15,560	30	0	0	0	0	3	15,560	30
	Total	447,796	233,322	52	159,322	36	55,153	12	0	0	0	0		55,153	12
El Minieh-Dennie	Lebanese	122,065	24,413	20	61,033	50	30,516	25	6,103	5	0	0	3	36,619	30
	Syrian Ref.	76,693	7,669	10	38,347	50	26,843	35	3,835	5	0	0	3	30,678	40
	Total	198,758	32,082	16	99,379	50	57,359	29	9,938	5	0	0		67,297	34
El Nabatieh	Lebanese	146,560	58,624	40	58,624	40	29,312	20	0	0	0	0	3	29,312	20
	Syrian Ref.	31,804	7,951	25	14,312	45	9,541	30	0	0	0	0	3	9,541	30
	Total	178,364	66,575	37	72,936	41	38,853	22	0	0	0	0		38,853	22

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#peop	%		#people	%
Hasbaya	Lebanese	25,759	10,304	40	11,592	45	3,864	15	0	0	0	0	2	3,864	15
	Syrian Ref.	5,489	1,372	25	3,019	55	1,098	20	0	0	0	0	3	1,098	20
	Total	31,248	11,676	37	14,611	47	4,962	16	0	0	0	0		4,962	16
Jbeil	Lebanese	115,689	69,413	60	40,491	35	5,784	5	0	0	0	0	2	5,784	5
	Syrian Ref.	10,826	3,789	35	5,413	50	1,624	15	0	0	0	0	2	1,624	15
	Total	126,515	73,203	58	45,904	36	7,408	6	0	0	0	0		7,408	6
Jezzine	Lebanese	27,163	9,507	35	16,298	60	1,358	5	0	0	0	0	2	1,358	5
	Syrian Ref.	4,180	1,045	25	2,508	60	627	15	0	0	0	0	2	627	15
	Total	31,343	10,552	34	18,806	60	1,985	6	0	0	0	0		1,985	6
Kesrwane	Lebanese	230,518	138,311	60	92,207	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
	Syrian Ref.	20,202	7,071	35	10,101	50	3,030	15	0	0	0	0	2	3,030	15
	Total	250,720	145,382	58	102,308	41	3,030	1	0	0	0	0		3,030	1
Marjaayoun	Lebanese	64,527	19,358	30	29,037	45	16,132	25	0	0	0	0	3	16,132	25
	Syrian Ref.	15,355	3,839	25	6,910	45	4,607	30	0	0	0	0	3	4,607	30
	Total	79,882	23,197	29	35,947	45	20,738	26	0	0	0	0		20,738	26
Rachaya	Lebanese	31,737	11,108	35	15,869	50	4,761	15	0	0	0	0	2	4,761	15
	Syrian Ref.	10,456	2,091	20	4,182	40	4,182	40	0	0	0	0	3	4,182	40
	Total	42,193	13,199	31	20,051	48	8,943	21	0	0	0	0		8,943	21
Saida	Lebanese	209,058	73,170	35	94,076	45	41,812	20	0	0	0	0	3	41,812	20
	Palestine Ref.	22,406	4,481	20	10,083	45	5,602	25	2,241	10	0	0	3	7,843	35
	Syrian Ref.	60,060	12,012	20	27,027	45	18,018	30	3,003	5	0	0	3	21,021	35
	Total	291,524	89,664	31	131,186	45	65,431	22	5,244	2	0	0		70,675	24
Sour	Lebanese	197,068	68,974	35	88,681	45	39,414	20	0	0	0	0	3	39,414	20
	Palestine Ref.	22,748	5,687	25	11,374	50	5,687	25	0	0	0	0	3	5,687	25
	Syrian Ref.	40,387	8,077	20	20,194	50	12,116	30	0	0	0	0	3	12,116	30
	Total	260,203	82,738	32	120,248	46	57,217	22	0	0	0	0		57,217	22
Tripoli	Lebanese	201,338	60,401	30	80,535	40	50,335	25	10,067	5	0	0	3	60,402	30
	Palestine Ref.	19,181	4,795	25	7,672	40	5,754	30	959	5	0	0	3	6,713	35
	Syrian Ref.	58,041	8,706	15	23,216	40	23,216	40	2,902	5	0	0	3	26,118	45
	Total	278,560	73,903	27	111,424	40	79,305	28	13,928	5	0	0		93,233	33
West Bekaa	Lebanese	67,832	27,133	40	30,524	45	10,175	15	0	0	0	0	2	10,175	15
	Syrian Ref.	95,629	19,126	20	47,815	50	28,689	30	0	0	0	0	3	28,689	30
	Total	163,461	46,259	28	78,339	48	38,864	24	0	0	0	0		38,864	24
Zahle	Lebanese	140,000	49,000	35	63,000	45	28,000	20	0	0	0	0	3	28,000	20
	Syrian Ref.	246,025	24,603	10	123,013	50	86,109	35	12,301	5	0	0	3	98,410	40
	Total	386,025	73,603	19	186,013	48	114,109	30	12,301	3	0	0		126,410	33
Zgharta	Lebanese	73,117	29,247	40	32,903	45	10,968	15	0	0	0	0	2	10,968	15
	Syrian Ref.	23,463	4,693	20	11,732	50	7,039	30	0	0	0	0	3	7,039	30
	Total	96,580	33,939	35	44,634	46	18,006	19	0	0	0	0		18,006	19
Palestine Refugees	PRS	30,220	3,022	10	13,599	45	12,088	40	1,511	5	0	0	3	13,599	45
	PRL	100,295	25,074	25	45,133	45	30,089	30	0	0	0	0	3	30,089	30
Total	Lebanese	3,864,268	1,543,101	40	1,638,563	42	641,901	17	40,709	1	0	0		682,610	18
	Syrian Ref.	1,500,000	259,759	17	730,463	49	470,563	31	39,222	3	0	0		509,785	34
	PRL	180,000	43,880	24	81,178	45	50,975	28	3,969	2	0	0		54,944	31
	PRS	30,220	3.022	10	13,599	45	12,088	40	1511	5	0	0		13,599	45
	Grand Total	**5,574,488**	**1,849,760**	**33**	**2,463,797**	**44**	**1,175,520**	**21**	**85,411**	**2**	**0**	**0**		**1,260,931**	**23**

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PROJECTION UPDATE OVERVIEW (APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2024)

The economic and financial crisis that affected Lebanon since October 2019 has significantly undermined the food security situation of those living in the country that is affected by institutional and social fragility and hosting a high number of refugees. In 2024, conflict, persisting inflation, cuts to humanitarian and social assistance, increased inter-community tensions, and continued uncertainty in Lebanon's governance structure are likely to have contributed to a further deterioration of Lebanon's food security situation.

The update of the Acute Food Insecurity IPC projection was carried out in all 26 districts in Lebanon covering four population groups: Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees in Lebanon, and Palestine refugees from Syria. The projection update covered over 99 percent of the population living in the country. During the projection period that goes from April to September 2024, it was estimated that about 1.26 million people corresponding to 23 percent of the analysed population, were expected to face high levels of food insecurity, and were classified in IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse). This represents a four percentage point increase from the 19 percent estimated to be in Phase 3 or above in the current period (October 2023 to March 2024). Moreover, this corresponds to a three percentage point increase from the previously estimated 20 percent in Phase 3 or above in the projection period. It was anticipated that the projection period would be characterized by the continuation of the conflict along Lebanon's southern border and protracted internal displacement, a fragile economy and rising inflation, additional cuts to humanitarian food assistance (HFA), and increasing tensions between the different population groups living in the country.

Lebanese residents: As a result of the updated assumptions, an increase of three percentage point in the acute food insecurity classification in comparison to the current and previously projected periods was expected. As such, during the updated projected period, it was estimated that 18 percent (683,000) of the Lebanese population were classified in Phase 3 or above, out of which one percent (41,000) were classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). During the updated projection period, residents living in 12 districts were classified in Phase 3. This includes Akkar, Baabda, Baalbek, Bent Jbeil, El Hermel, El Minieh-Dennie, El Nabatieh, Tripoli, Saida, Sour, Zahle, and Marjaayoun, in comparison to seven districts previously classified in Phase 3 for the projection period. The highest occurrence of acute food insecurity during the projected period was estimated in Akkar district (104,000), followed by Baabda (82,000), Tripoli (60,000) and Baalbek (58,000).

Syrian refugees: 34 percent (510,000 people) were projected in Phase 3 or above, a seven and one percentage point increase in comparison to the current and previously projected periods respectively. Around 471,000 Syrian refugee (31 percent) were classified in Phase 3 and 39,000 (3 percent) were classified in Phase 4. In the updated projection period, 21 out of the 26 districts where refugees are living were classified in Phase 3, in comparison to 19 districts previously classified in Phase 3 for the projection period. The highest incidence of acute food insecurity for Syrian refugees during the updated period was expected in six districts (Akkar, El Minieh-Dennie, Tripoli, Baalbek, Rachaya, and Zahle) where the percentage of the Syrian refugees classified in Phase 3 or above was estimated between 40 and 45 percent. This was followed by El Hermel, Baabda, and Saida districts where 35 percent of Syrian refugees were expected to face acute food insecurity during the projected period. In absolute terms, with 98,000 people in Phase 3 or above, Zahle was the district with the highest number of Syrian refugees who were estimated to be in high levels of acute food insecurity, followed by Baalbek (75,000) and Akkar (63,000). The analysis identified as main drivers of food insecurity the reduction in coverage of HFA, the ongoing conflict (resulting in internal displacement), and increasing cost of living (impacting both daily wages and cash-based food assistance purchasing power).

Palestine Refugees in Lebanon and Palestine Refugees from Syria: a total of 55,000 (31 percent) PRL were classified at Phase 3 or above during the updated projected period, corresponding to five and four percentage point increases compared to the current and previously projected periods respectively. Moreover, around 4,000 people were classified in Phase 4. As for the PRS population, 45 percent (13,600) were classified in Phase 3 or above during the projected period, corresponding to 10 and 5 percentage point increases compared to the current and previously projected periods respectively. For the PRS population, 1,500 individuals were classified in Phase 4 in the updated projection. A total of 35 percent of PRL population residing in camps in Saida and Tripoli were classified in Phase 3 or above, out of which 10 percent and 5 percent were classified in Phase 4 in Saida and Tripoli camps respectively. The expected deterioration of acute food insecurity levels among Palestine refugees was associated with the expected reduction in humanitarian food assistance during the projection period as well as the conflict and inflation.

Key Assumprions

Conflict

The updated projection analysis assumed that the conflict along Lebanon's southern border, ongoing since 8 October 2023, would not spiral into a full-scale conflict. It was assumed that armed clashes would continue with similar intensity and remain mostly localized in the south and Nabatieh Governorates. It has also been assumed that the conflict's primary impact area would remain within the 7 km border radius. However, less frequent attacks targeting areas of Mount Lebanon, Baalbek-El Hermel, and Bekaa governorates were also expected. Displacement was also expected to continue increasing, potentially reaching 140,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) by September 2024 from 91,000 IDPs in April 2024. The analysis also assumed safe access of HFA to conflict zones and still functioning markets in conflict areas.

Humanitarian assistance

The coverage of HFA was expected to further decline among Lebanese, Syrian refugees, and Palestine refugees beyond what was initially projected. Similarly, the value of food security assistance was expected to further decline dropping to less than 50 percent coverage of the caloric requirements for Syrian refugees (from 76 percent in May 2023) and to less than 30 percent for Lebanese (also from 76 percent). Coverage of social assistance programmes for Lebanese was expected to be close to zero starting July 2024 as there was no funding visibility for the National Social Safety Net program (NPTP) beyond June 2024 in addition to delays in the implementation of the extension of the AMAN programme that was also expected to impact the disbursement of social assistance during the projection period. Food assistance to Lebanese was anticipated to drop by a further 10 percent starting June 2024. Among Syrian refugees, an additional 15 percent decrease in HFA was expected, in addition to the 30 percent cut that materialized in December 2023. Among PRL and PRS, additional decrease in the coverage and value of the assistance were also likely to materialize, due to funding challenges that UNRWA is facing.

Economic growth

The gross domestic product (GDP), which was initially expected to grow by 0.2 percent in 2023, has instead declined by 0.2 percent continuing a six-year downturn. Economic growth in 2024 was expected to be minimal, ranging between zero and 0.5 percent.

Currency depreciation

The informal exchange rate was anticipated to remain stable throughout the projected period. Exchange rate stability was expected to be sustained by interventions from the central bank (Circular 158, Circular 166), a stable monetary base (ranging around the LBP 58 trillion level, and down from LBP 81 trillion at the end of May 2023), public sector salaries and allowances paid in US dollars, injections of foreign currency through tourist's receipts and MTOs exchanges, and collection of taxes in LBPs. Despite the ongoing conflict having already impacted the winter 2023 and spring 2024 tourist seasons along with the inflow of foreign currencies, the exchange rate has remained stable so far and as such was expected to remain stable until the end of the projection period despite a negative outlook for the upcoming summer 2024 tourist season.

Inflation

Inflation was expected to persist and remain within the last six months level (27 percent increase between August 2023 and February 2024), driven by the cost of essential services (electricity, water, education, and health) in addition to rent, which were expected to continue rising to pre-crisis levels in USD terms. Food inflation was expected to be impacted by the likely phase out of the bread subsidy that was expected to push the food SMEB price by up to 10 percent, while the global outlook of commodities in the international market for the next year was expected to remain stable.

Recovery plans

As the political deadlock continues across the different political levels, it has been assumed that no further progress would be made in the implementation of the structural and financial reforms required under the IMF Staff Level Agreement signed two years ago to access financial aid.

Tensions

Increasing intercommunal tensions were expected in the upcoming months as negative perceptions of communal relations between residents and refugee population increase.

Lebanon's security situation remains uncertain as clashes along its southern border intensified

As war broke out on 7 October 2023 in the Occupied Palestinian Territory of Gaza, violent cross-border clashes along Lebanon's southern border have been increasing in number and intensity, possibly risking the eruption of a major armed conflict in the region. In March 2024, The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) expressed concern over the expansion and intensification of the crossfire, which has already led to numerous casualties and significant damage to homes, relief centres, and public infrastructures.

As of the end of March 2024, it was estimated that more than 91,000 people have already been displaced from southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) has reported a total of 306 killed and 820 people wounded with at least 51 confirmed civilian deaths as of March 2024. OCHA reported that nearly 60,000 civilians remain in the conflict-affected areas and priorities identified through field visits include urgent health interventions, notably for chronic disease medications, alongside the provision of multi-purpose cash assistance. Based on satellite imagery, the total land area affected by fires due to shelling in southern Lebanon reached 1,897 hectares. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 63 percent of farmers faced challenges in safely reaching their fields, with 26 percent forced to entirely abandon their agricultural fields due to displacement. Furthermore, 23 percent of farmers experienced a decrease in their harvest yields. Additionally, 85 percent of farming households encountered difficulties in transporting their agricultural products. In total, 72 percent of farmers reported losses in their income (OCHA).

The Ministry of Agriculture also estimates that 60,000 olive trees have been affected, while the World Bank hinted at 100,000 square meters of olive groves damaged by the conflict. The resulting financial estimate of the damage to farms and livestock has reached so far USD2.5 billion, according to the ministry, which highlighted that the south accounts for 30 percent of the country's agricultural production.

However, while various airlines issued decisions to cancel flights to Lebanon at the onset of the conflict and south border clashes, the national carrier instituted contingency measures, reducing by 80 percent their flights at one point in November 2023. Most of the measures have returned to normal levels since then. In addition, while a drop of 14 percent in arrivals through Beirut Airport during the Winter holidays Season was registered in December 2023 compared to December 2022, the drop in the first quarter of 2024 compared to the same quarter in 2023 stood at only 4 percent, with arrival reaching nearly 20 thousand per day during the last week of March and first week of April 2024, prior to the Easter and Eid Al Fitr period, with mostly expats returning home to spend time with their families.

The analysis accounted for available information, which encompassed several aspects such as access to food and population displacement in districts directly affected by the clashes. Given Lebanon's heavy dependence on imports and tourism, its already failing infrastructures and fragile value chains, and its dependence on remittance, the consequences in the event of further escalation of the conflict would be harsh. As such, continuous monitoring of the situation is of the utmost importance.

Economic stagnation was expected to persist throughout the projection period

Following a strong tourism summer season, economic growth of up to 0.2 percent of GDP was initially expected in 2023. However, the World Bank, in its 2023 Fall Economic Monitor, has revised this growth projection to a decline of up to 0.6 percent of GDP following the onset of the conflict in the Southern regions and its repercussions on both the economy and the number of arrivals to the country. This marked the sixth year in a row registering a contraction of the GDP. In 2024, estimates point to a weak economic growth of 0.5 percent as GDP growth continues to be impacted by the conflict and the negative outlook for tourism receipts.

Despite exchange rate and international food price stability, inflation was expected to continue rising driven by increasing cost of services

The exchange rate was expected to remain stable throughout the projection period supported by several interventions from the central bank. It was expected that the central bank will continue the implementation of circular 158 and circular 166 that allow for limited USD withdrawal from old bank deposits. It was also expected that the Central Bank will continue implementing steps towards the unification of the exchange rates through circular 167 that requires banks to use the USD/LBP 89,500 rate for their financial statements aligning the exchange rate to the one used in the recently approved 2024 public budget. Exchange rate stability was also expected to be supported by the recent decision of the caretaker cabinet to adjust public salaries and benefits with a retroactive effect from December 2023 and disburse them in US dollars. In parallel, the Central Bank has been able to expand its foreign currency reserves by more than USD1 billion between July 2023 and March 2024 and was able to maintain the local currency in circulation around the LBP58 to LBP60 trillion level (equivalent to around USD670 Million by the end of March 2024), and thus limited the availability of cash that could be used in currency exchange operations that tend to pressure the Lebanese Lira.

The stability in the exchange rate in turn was expected to positively reflect on food inflation. Given Lebanon's high import dependency, any deterioration in the exchange rate directly leads to soaring inflation. Given the expected stability in the exchange rate, any changes in the price of essential food and non-food items would be tied mostly to oscillations in international prices of commodities and products that, on the short term, were expected to remain stable. After surpassing pre-crisis levels since August 2023, the cost of the Food SMEB per person has stabilized around the USD34 – USD35 level since October 2023 onwards. As such, stability in food prices was expected to continue in Lebanon for the mid-term outlook (April till September 2024), with a potential one time increase of 8 to 10 percent in the cost of the food SMEB once the subsidy on wheat will be discontinued, anticipated to happen around September 2024, following the exhaustion of the loan from the World Bank through which the subsidy is currently financed.

However, price of essential services, such as electricity, water, education, and health, among others, were expected to continue rising over the next year to pre-crisis levels in USD terms. The non-food SMEB stood at USD231 per family in February 2024, up by 68 percent from USD137 per family in August 2023 at the time of the previous IPC analysis. However, this still represents around 57 percent of its value at the start of the crisis in October 2019 (USD 403 per family). The newly introduced taxes and fees as part of the recently approved 2024 public budget as well are expected to cause some additional upward pressures on inflation in the country, especially affecting services and non-food essential items.

The Wheat Supply Emergency Response Project was likely to last beyond the end of the projection period in September 2024

The Wheat Supply Emergency Response Project, funded through a USD150 million loan agreement with the World Bank that de-facto continued the subsidization of bread in Lebanon, although the applied exchange rate increased from USD/LBP 15,000 to USD/LBP 30,000 in October 2023. A total of 460,000 tons of wheat were imported between January 2023 and January 2024. Imported wheat through the loan is now expected to last potentially until the end of the projection period in September 2024. The end of the subsidy would lead to an 80 to 100 percent cost increase in bread packages and an increase in the SMEB of approximately 10 percent.

A reduction in the level of assistance was expected to impact Lebanese, Syrian refugees, and Palestine refugees

The level of HFA was expected to further decline during the projection period, beyond what was first anticipated, with cuts to assistance affecting all population groups. Assistance to Lebanese was anticipated to be much lower than expected while assistance to Syrian refugees has been impacted by further cuts.

Starting in January 2024, and until June 2024, Lebanese households benefiting from the NPTP have been receiving a reduced transfer value (TV) of USD 10 per month for food capped at a maximum of five household members per family (a reduction from USD 20, while it used to be capped at six household members per family). This was only enough to cover 29 percent of the food SMEB as of February 2024, down from 66 percent in August 2023. The frequency of NPTP transfers has been also reduced and, transfers have been taking place once every two months, covering assistance for two months (i.e., USD20 every two months). Given funding constraints, as well as a lack of visibility on NPTP confirmed contributions beyond June 2024, it was expected that Lebanese families benefitting from the NPTP will no longer receive assistance as of July 2024. As of March 2024, the NPTP received contributions from donors for USD 33.3 million in front of a total requirement for 2024 of USD 147 million (23 percent). In addition, delays in the extension of the AMAN programme were expected. The loan agreement needed to finance the continuation of the AMAN programme has not been finalized yet. AMAN reached over 322 thousand vulnerable Lebanese in August 2023 and is expected to reach up to 160,000 families for 12 months through this additional financing. However, families benefitting from AMAN have gradually stopped receiving payments as they reached the maximum number of benefits expected by this phase of the programme. AMAN transfers have stopped since February 2024 and the analysis assumed that the programme will not resume before the end of the projection period.

Syrian refugees were also expected to be impacted by further cuts to the level of HFA following the reduction that took place December 2023 leading to the discontinuation of assistance provided to over 100,000 vulnerable Syrian refugees' families (30 percent of the population) and the decrease of the TV provided for food assistance from USD20 to USD15 per person, with a capping of five household members per family. An additional assistance cut was announced in March 2024 to take place from May 2024 onwards and impacting 15 percent of Syrian refugees, with the discontinuation of around 35 thousand families. As such the total number of refugees receiving assistance has now dropped by nearly 45 percent, from more than 1.3 million assisted in 2023 to around 750 thousand individuals from May 2024 onwards. In February 2024, the food TV covered 44 percent of the food SMEB, down from 66 percent in August 2023 and 76 percent in May 2023 when dual currency disbursements were re-introduced.

Among Palestine refugees in Lebanon, assistance was likely to decrease in the updated projection period, as the multipurpose cash assistance relies on availability of funding that has been decreasing recently, as UNRWA continue to face funding constraints, while assistance to Palestine refugees from Syria is expected to decrease as well in the 2024 projection period.

Inflation and reduction in humanitarian food security assistance coverage were expected to have an impact on household food security outcome indicators

The World Food Programme (WFP) conducted an analysis using the Shock and Assistance Platform for Economic Simulations (SHAPES)[1] to evaluate the food security status of both Lebanese and Syrian refugees, focusing on three key factors: 1) changes in humanitarian assistance, 2) food price inflation, and 3) fluctuations in the exchange rate. The SHAPES model uses the Lebanon Vulnerability Assessment Panel (LVAP) household survey conducted between December 2022 and April 2023 as its baseline data.

In the modeled scenario, the Lebanese pound depreciated by 44.6 percent from January 2023 to February 2024, shifting from USD/LBP49,723 to USD/LBP89,700. Furthermore, real food inflation, calculated using its US dollar equivalent, increased by 32.5 percent during the same period. These macroeconomic developments coincided with a reduction of almost one-third in the number of households receiving assistance, and a reduction in the transfer value of Humanitarian Food Assistance between 25 to 50 percent. Estimations were performed on the change in real food expenditure per capita measured by the economic capacity to meet essential needs indicator (ECMEN) and on the change in diet adequacy measured by the food consumption score (FCS).

During the period under consideration, the SHAPES model indicated a deterioration of the food security status of both population groups, but of a significantly larger magnitude among Syrian refugees compared to Lebanese. According to the simulations, both population groups were likely to face reduced economic capacity as up to 42 percent of Lebanese (from 32 percent previously) and up to 89 percent of Syrian refugees (from 54 percent previously) were projected to have expenditure below the MEB and were at risk of seeing their ability to meet essential needs hindered by inflation, currency depreciation, and discontinuation from assistance. Among Lebanese, reduced economic capacity did not translate in a significant deterioration in diet adequacy rates as the FCS indicator remained generally stable with a very slight increase in the proportion of the Lebanese population with poor FCS. Among Syrian refugees, the SHAPES model predicted a substantial increase in the percentage of households with inadequate food consumption as the percentage of Syrian refugee households projected in the poor FCS category increased from 9 to 13 percent while those classified as borderline were estimated to increase from nearly 22 percent to 25 percent.

The SHAPES analysis is subject to two significant limitations. The reliance on remittances as a substantial source of household earnings in Lebanon presents a notable challenge as it is limitedly reported in the LVAP data. The model's ability to account for the potential rise in food expenditures (in nominal terms) in response to elevated levels of inflation is somehow limited. Households may adjust their spending patterns to maintain a minimum level of consumption by curtailing non-essential expenses, depleting savings, and resorting to credit purchases and other coping strategies. Consequently, the ECMEN values provided likely represent an upper bound estimate for the entire sample.

[1] The model is initialized by updating various assistance programs, food inflation and exchange rates to their February 2024 levels in Lebanon. Assistance data are sourced from WFP, while food price inflation rates are determined using data from the MEB to ensure alignment with food items consumed by vulnerable households. Additionally, the parallel exchange rate is utilized to convert US Dollars to Lebanese Pounds. These inputs drive the simulations forward. Subsequently, the model adjusts household income and expenditures by leveraging a quadratic almost ideal demand system (QUAIDS). This system integrates data on various food expenditure categories and prices of goods from the baseline. Through the QUAIDS model, SHAPES estimates changes in household expenditures across specific goods categories in response to the updated conditions. Moreover, to achieve accurate estimations of changes in household food expenditures, the model employs a Working-Leser model. This further enhances precision in forecasting adjustments to household food spending. For further details on the SHAPES methodology, please refer to WFP, *Estimating the impact of cuts in WFP assistance, a look at highly affected operations using micro-data,* September 2023.

Additional information on the QUAIDS and Working-Leser models are available at https://ebrary.ifpri.org/digital/api/collection/p15738coll2/id/134675/download

Continued uncertainty in Lebanon's governance structure likely to further delay the implementation of reforms

As Lebanon continues to face the harsh consequences of the economic crisis, the country continues to be confronted with uncertainty in its governance structure. The presidential vacuum was expected to persist, at least until the end of the projection period in September 2024, risking further political deadlock, as both the caretaker government and parliament ability to govern remain limited. The recently approved third extension for the term of municipalities by the Parliament further highlights this continued deadlock and limits the ability to govern at the local and regional levels. The increasing number of vacancies in key positions, such as the Head of the Central Bank, was expected to continue as well throughout the projection period.

No progress has taken place previously on the reform package required by the IMF staff level agreement, which was signed two years ago in April 2022. As the political deadlock persists, and with the limited ability of the parliament to legislate, no developments on that front were expected in the short term. In a recent visit to Lebanon in April 2024, the IMF Executive Director assured that "the IMF is not planning on cancelling the agreement signed with Lebanon". However, he stressed that economic recovery for the country "is impossible so long as the government continues to be unable to adopt legislation relating to the restructuring of banks and a resolution of the deposit problem in a sustainable manner"".

Increasing tensions

An increase in intercommunal tensions has been registered since the beginning of 2023. Based on the UNDP led Tension Monitoring System (TMS), inter-communal relations were at their lowest point in May 2023 as 46 percent of respondents reported negative communal relations, while 44 percent continued to report the same by November 2023. Competition for low skilled jobs was the most-frequently cited source of inter-communal tensions, by both Lebanese and Syrians, with 54 percents of respondents mentioning that in November 2023. In a context of increasing economic vulnerabilities, depleting services, and decreasing humanitarian food assistance for all population groups, there is a high risk that competition for services could further exacerbate tensions. Moreover, during the last three years, it was evident that due to the deteriorating economic situation, Lebanese are taking up jobs in previously disregarded sectors such as construction and agriculture, resulting in an increase in job competition. Such conditions are likely to persist as threats to Lebanon's stability, with the potential for inter and intra-communal tensions to continue and possibly intensify as communities compete for resources. The latest TMS survey in November 2023 also showed that 84 percent of the surveyed populations (both Lebanese and Syrians) believe that refugee presence in Lebanon is placing too many strains on the country's resources.

In addition, as refugees' living conditions further deteriorate, increases in migration flows are likely to materialize, using Lebanon as a stop along the journey. Recent reports from Cyprus have noted concerns over the spike of Syrian refugees arriving from Lebanon by boats, with at least 600 arrivals in four days at the end of March and beginning of April 2024. According to official data, around 2 thousand persons arrived in Cyprus by sea in the first three months of 2024, compared to only 78 individuals in the same period of 2023. As the situation of refugees grow more harsh and milder weather conditions settle in the upcoming summer period, a higher number of vulnerable refugees could potentially put their life at risk to undertake the ten-hour boat ride between Lebanon and Cyprus.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

Response Priorities

Situation monitoring: This report assumed the "most likely scenario" of no full-scale war to materialize in Lebanon, as a result of the ongoing conflict in the southern regions of the country since October 2023. However, continuous monitoring of the situation remains of the utmost importance. It will also be important to monitor the impact of the escalating hostilities on the food security and agricultural livelihoods of the affected farmers in Lebanon and gain deeper understanding into the challenges they faced within the conflict areas, specifically in South and Nabatiyeh governorates. In addition, this update for the projection period analysis assumed a certain level of economic stagnation, similar to what the country has witnessed over the past six months. Economic shocks that have the potential to exacerbate the economic situation in the country will need to be closely monitored.

Lifesaving and Humanitarian Food Assistance: Urgent action continues to be required to save lives and reduce food consumption gaps of populations categorized as being in Emergency and Crisis (IPC Phases 4 and 3) by improving access to food through appropriate modalities. The recently announced additional cuts to HFA to Syrian refugees, along with the lack of visibility on funding of the different social assistance programs to Lebanese, along with the decrease in the provided TVs, are likely to have detrimental effects on the lives and wellbeing of affected populations but will take time to fully materialize. As the different vulnerable population groups start to deplete their coping mechanisms to face these cuts and secure their essential needs, this has the possibility of having long lasting effects on health and education levels of an entire generation, especially among refugees populations. This would in turn impact their longer-term ability to find employment and livelihoods sources for themselves and their families, eventually leading to a comparatively higher financial burden on host populations and supporting countries. As such, as people continue to exhaust their remaining coping strategies, the full detrimental effects of these ongoing cuts are expected to further exacerbate in the medium to long term outlook.

The conflict has led to significant internal displacement as well as to the loss of livelihoods. To date, FSAS partners have provided food assistance to conflict-affected people across the country, including around 20,500 families, in addition to a one-time off cash-based food assistance to 30 thousand families, and the provision of school meals to around 13,500 students, on top of its regular activities. Sustaining this assistance remains crucial considering increasing needs amidst the volatility of the situation along with the need to respond in a timely and urgent manner to affected people while contributing to overall data assurance, accountability and system strengthening as part of advanced preparedness measures.

Although an exact approximation of the impact of assistance cannot be made through this analysis, it has been assumed that some portion of households classified in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) are also vulnerable and are not classified in more severe phases because of the level of assistance that was previously delivered. Therefore, it is crucial to monitor the situation and implement activities that help mitigate the potential negative impact on their livelihoods and continue assisting those households to prevent them from moving to higher food insecurity phases.

As such, it remains crucial that the value of humanitarian cash-based food assistance, which was recently reduced for both Lebanese and Syrian refugees, is set based on needs and gaps. An alignment between the transfer value of cash for food and multi-purpose cash assistance with the market-based Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) and household economic capacity values is crucial, while regularly updating the assistance provided to all populations based on the monitoring of risk factors and contextual development, can help ensure that food insecurity levels are properly tackled.

Social safety net systems: The implementation of the AMAN extension is of the utmost importance to ensure that the projected deterioration in the food security situation among Lebanese residents does not fully materialize. This is in addition to securing the needed funding for the NPTP beyond June 2024, to ensure that the most vulnerable Lebanese households, continue to receive assistance needed to ensure access to food and other essential needs. In parallel, the gradual and full unification of the different existing social safety nets remains important to ensure appropriate operational implementation and governance. The proper implementation and standardization of such programs, especially as the removal of the last remaining subsidy in the country becomes closer, is required to ensure that consistent assistance is provided to extremely poor and food insecure Lebanese families. As such, it will be of the utmost importance that adequate technical assistance to the Government of Lebanon is provided to ensure appropriate social safety nets design in terms of coverage and benefit package to address the needs of poor and food insecure Lebanese.

Livelihoods assistance: While the economy is likely to have started to stabilize on a lower but more clear economic output for the country compared to the drastic deterioration between 2020 and 2022, this economic stabilization remains fragile. As such, the scale-up of different livelihood support programs, especially those in the agricultural sector, becomes of the outmost importance, to ensure access to stable income sources and mitigate losses of purchasing power that the most vulnerable households face. This is especially important as the local agriculture has been greatly affected by both the ongoing conflict in the South and heavy rainfall in the North during the Winter 2023/2024 season.

In addition to food needs, households have a multitude of essential needs. As such, strengthening their economy and resilience can position them to better tackle those needs while remaining food and nutritionally secure. Interventions targeting micro, small and medium enterprises and cooperatives are crucial for improved performance and expanded market access, which stimulate local markets and improve local economic growth. It is primordial to assist farmers in enhancing their capacity for safe storage practices to prevent further depletion of assets and ensure continued market access. Given the vital role farmers play in ensuring food security, the absence of agricultural outputs can have significant repercussions (FAO, 2024).

Agricultural asset creation and recovery: Expansion of the asset creation and recovery programmes in agriculture especially in rural areas with high reliance on food from own production and in areas with high prevalence of households in IPC Phase 2 (Stress) to protect already volatile livelihoods sources. This could include the scale-up of cash assistance to reach a greater number of small-scale crop producers and livestock keepers to improve access to quality agricultural inputs (fertilizers, pesticides and seeds, feed, veterinary services), as well as the focus on capacity building initiatives. In addition, and once the situation allows it, it is crucial that appropriate intervention programs in the Southern area of the country take place, to help rehabilitate the damages that have affected the agriculture sector, estimated by the Ministry of Agriculture to have reached nearly USD2.5 billion by April 2024.

Further expand the coverage of school meals programs: As the education system continues to be severely affected by the economic crisis and the number of working children has remarkably increased as more girl and boy students between the ages of 6 and 14 have dropped out of school to support their families economically, it will be essential to ensure the provision of nutritious and healthy school meals and snacks to improve children's ability to learn and encourage school enrolment and regular attendance by girls and boys aged between 5 and14 years. It will be also essential to strengthen the capacity of health educators to reinforce good nutrition practices to school-aged girls and boys and to connect school kitchens with local agri-food businesses to strengthen resilience and the local economy.

Further enhance food security and nutrition information and monitoring systems: Given the volatility of the food security and vulnerability situation in Lebanon it will be required to continue generating timely, reliable, and sustainable food security and nutrition information and analysis to enable effective national and regional policies and interventions aiming at decreasing food insecurity and malnutrition. To ensure sustainable food security analysis and data, it will be important to enhance the ability of national entities to collect, analyse, and disseminate food security and nutrition information.

Enhance nutrition-sensitive programs: Interventions to prevent multiple burdens of malnutrition must be scaled up through multi-sectoral approach to improve diets, practices, and services. Interventions with clear nutrition goals and actions that aim to improve nutrition outcomes by addressing the underlying determinants of malnutrition, such as food insecurity with a potential to improve the food and nutrition security of the vulnerable high-risk population particularly among women and young children.

Situation monitoring and update

- **Humanitarian and social assistance:** The loss of purchasing power that household might incur, due to assistance cuts that are decreasing both the provided transfer value and the number of assisted vulnerable households, may limit the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance in keeping the food security situation stable, given a continuously rapid changing context.
- **Prices:** Even if exchange rate stability projection materializes, any food price inflation due to increasing transportation costs, as well as removal of the remaining wheat subsidy without alternative assistance framework, may keep the market prices for staples and essential non-food commodities beyond manageable levels.

- **Non-food expenditures:** The continued adjustments of essential non-food services prices, due to the ongoing dollarization in the country, as well as any potential new tariffs that might be introduced, may further increase the stain on households' purchasing power and expenditures in the upcoming year.
- **Nutrition:** Monitoring of malnutrition is also necessary. The results from the upcoming Lebanon's first ever Integrated Micronutrient, Anthropometric and Child development Survey will help the Ministry of Health and Nutrition partners ascertain the opportunity to conduct an IPC Acute Malnutrition (AMN).

Risk factors to monitor

- Increased inter community tensions as well as tensions against refugees.
- Security situation developments and expansions of clashes in the South border area.
- Renewed currency depreciation and exchange rate evolution.
- Inflation and commodity prices both on the local and international markets.

PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

The update of the projected IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis was conducted for the projected period: April – September 2024. The update covered all 26 districts of the country. Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees have been analyzed separately at the district level, while PRL residing in camps have been analyzed at area level (5 areas), and PRL residing outside camps and in gatherings, in addition to PRS have been analyzed at national level. The analysis was conducted between 18 and 22 March, 2024.

The analysis was held in Beirut, Lebanon with in-person modality, with the support provided by the IPC Global Support Unit (GSU) virtually. The workshop was attended by 35 experts including Technical Working Group members and analysts from UN organizations, local and international NGOs, technical agencies, academia, and governmental institutions. Most members of this round of analysis and facilitators have local expertise which better supported in understanding the overall context to ensure a contextualized and accurate reflection of food insecurity needs in Lebanon.

Given that an update of the projection was conducted, analysts relied mainly on data and information related to contributing factors rather than outcome indicators. However, outcome indicators were available for some the districts from the mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (mVAM) conducted by WFP with data from November 2023 till March 2024. Moreover, other data sources providing information regarding the food insecurity contribution factors have been included such as WFP Basic Needs Outcome Monitoring (BNOM), FAO Data in Emergency and Impact Assessment (DIEM), UNHCR protection monitoring, Overview of communal relations in Lebanon (Tension monitoring) conducted by UNDP; Market monitors by WFP, displacement data by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) through the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) and the DRR/DRM dashboard. Additionally, Humanitarian Food Assistance data was provided by the Food Security and Agriculture sector with the support of all reporting partners.

Assessing the levels and the broader mitigating effect of Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) is a key component of an IPC analysis, as IPC is a snapshot analysis and integrates all aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to the current and projected situation. The IPC protocols are not designed (nor should they be used) to assess or evaluate the impact of any humanitarian food assistance on food insecurity, or to monitor achievements towards program level goals.

HFA that can be considered for an IPC analysis includes direct resource transfers that aim to reduce food gaps, protect, and save lives and livelihoods. Only transfers that are intended to have an immediate positive effect on access to food were considered in the analysis.

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Acute Food Insecurity Phase name and description

Phase 1 None/Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine
Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Households either: • have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; **or** • are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	Households either: • have large food consumption gaps that are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; **or** • are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. For famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)

What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity?

The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of acute food and nutrition crises as well as chronic food insecurity based on international standards. The IPC consists of four mutually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consensus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and comparability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and programming.

For the IPC, Acute Food Insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity.

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Classification of food insecurity and malnutrition was conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Against Hunger, CARE, CILSS, EC-JRC , FAO, FEWSNET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IFPRI, IGAD, Oxfam, PROGRESAN-SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and World Bank..

IPC Analysis Partners: